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Historical Analysis Series

A CMH STUDY

A PATTERN FOR JOINT OPERATIONS:
WORLD WAR II CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

NORTH AFRICA

by Daniel R. Mortensen

Office of Air Force History and U.S. Army Center of Military History

Historical Analysis Series

A PATTERN FOR JOINT OPERATIONS:
WORLD WAR II CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, NORTH AFRICA

Office of Air Force History and
U.S. Army Center of Military History
Washington, D.C.

Mortensen, Daniel R.

A pattern for joint operations.

(Historical analysis series)

1. World War, 1939-19^5 — Campaigns—Africa, North.

2. World War, 1939-19^5 — Aerial operations, American.

3. Unified operations (Military science) I. Title.
II. Series.

D766.82.M63 1987 9kO,5h'23 87-19335

CMH Pub 93-7

First Printing 1987

f^or s&lfr by the i^upGnnLGndtynt of Documents, U .S. Oov-crnmont Print-in^ ^}fficc
Wellington, DC 20402

FOREWORD

This study in the Historical Analysis Series examines a subject of importance
not only to the Army but also to the Air Force: the origin and development of
American close air support doctrine and practice in World War It The idea for the
study resulted from a review of the Memorandum of Understanding between the
Army and Air Force chiefs of staff, concluded on 22 May 1984, and of the
initiatives that emerged from that historic document, particularly Initiative 24,
which reaffirmed the Air Force's mission to provide close air support to the Army.
The project has been a cooperative effort between the U.S. Army Center of
Military History and the U.S.A.F. Office of Air Force History; an Air Force
historian was assigned to write the study under the supervision of the Center of
Military History. The resulting work, ultimately the best judgment of the author
based on historical evidence, is titled A Pattern for Joint Operations: World War II
Close Air Support, North Africa . The concentration is on the North African
campaign because that was the first major large-unit test of American ground
armies in World War II, and in that campaign the basic system of close air support
for American ground and air forces in World War II was first worked out.

Close air support doctrine both then and now is critical to the services. As
this study demonstrates, the doctrine that had been conceived and practiced prior
to the first American battles of World War II fell apart in the mud and fog of
Tunisia. Both air and ground commanders in 1941 recognized the necessity of close
cooperation between the staffs and forces in joint and combined forces. What they
had to learn in 1942 was the degree to which close air support doctrine tested that
cooperation and required alteration. The struggle of ground and air leaders to
define and construct a command and control system, and ultimately to allocate and
commit precious air resources to requisite ground missions, has as many lessons
today as it did more than forty years ago.

We believe this study merits careful reading by all those who must plan and
prepare for combat.

RICHARD H. KOHN WILLIAM A. STOFFT

Chief Brigadier General, U.S. Army

Office of Air Force History Chief of Military History

Washington, D.C.
1 August 1987

iii

THE AUTHOR

Daniel R. Mortensen, a historian with the Office of Air Force History,
received his B.A. and M.A. in history from the University of California, Riverside,
and a doctorate in 1976 from the University of Southern California (USC). He
taught at several institutions in southern California, including USC, Pepperdine,
and Loyola, and subsequently a course in aviation technology at the University of
Maryland, College Park. Before coming to Washington in 1981, he served as deputy
command historian of the Air Force Communications Command at Scott Air Force
Base, Illinois. He specializes in the history of communications, aviation
technology, and tactical aviation, and he has given papers on all these topics. In
1986 he was temporarily assigned to the U.S. Army Center of Military History, to
write this study. Currently, he is completing a history of World War II tactical
aviation for the Office of Air Force History.

PREFACE

In 198* increasing concern about joint service operations occasioned the
Chiefs of Staff of the United States Air Force and Army to investigate interservice
cooperation. On 22 May Generals Charles A. Gabriel and John A. Wickham, Jr.,
signed an agreement to improve the battlefield cooperation between the Air Force
and Army. The agreement recommended thirty-one topics, or areas, called the "31
Initiatives," for further investigation. In turn, Army and Air Force historians
agreed that a study of the origins of modern close air support practices could help
shed light on one particular initiative, namely, current close air support practices.
After a preliminary investigation of research resources, the concept for this
manuscript was redefined as a study of doctrinal formation and close air support
practices during the important early phases of World War II. Archival records
indicated that ground and air leaders had an abiding concern about the nature and
practice of close air support in modern combined battle operations, and they
compiled a long and rich record. This study combines research materials, including
some newly discovered documents from both Arrny and Air Force archives, and it
reflects as well the combined knowledge and effort of both Army and Air Force
historians.

The story of events in Washington and North Africa between 1939 and mid-
19*3, when the Allies defeated Axis forces in Tunisia, has current significance.
The interplay of staff planning and attempts to define doctrine, the organization of
training and field operations, and adjustments to the demands of technology should
be instructive. Generals George C. Marshall, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Henry H.
Arnold, George 5. Patton, Jr., Omar N. Bradley, Carl Spaatz, and other air and
ground leaders were vitally concerned with the cohesiveness of their combined
forces— that is, the shared understanding among the leaders in Washington and the
commanders at theater and task force levels. Another aspect that may be of
interest to Army students of close air support is the testing of War Department
doctrine in the muddy terrain of Tunisia, under the constraints of "the fog of
battle," that typified the Allied experience in North Africa. Air Force leaders may
also find, at the very least, some value in the struggle to define command and
control systems or in the attitudes of ground personnel, especially the latter's need
to understand the commitment of air-to-ground tasks.

It is altogether fitting that this study of joint air-ground operations in World
War II should recognize the early support of those Army and Air Force people who
found a historical analysis to be important. Army Col. David Cooper and Air
Force Lt. Col. Edward Land of the Joint Assessment and Initiative Office; Col.
Ken Kissell of the Chief of Staff, USAF, Staff Group; Lt. Col. Robert Frank and
Dr. Alexander S. Cochran, Jr., of the U.S. Army Center of Military History; and
Mr. Herman Wolk and Col. Fred Shiner of the Office of Air Force History—each in
their own way offered encouragement for the particular subject of close air
support and to the idea of a cross-service research project.

Librarians and archivist at the U.S. Army Center of Military History and at
the Office of Air Force History were particularly helpful. At the Center of
Military History Miss Hannah Zeidlik, Ms, Barbara Williams, and Ms. Geraldine K.
Judkins dug out historical documents and records and found books relating to the
subject. Mr. William C. Heimdahl and M. Sgt. Roger A. Jernigan at the Office of
Air Force History offered advice and unending effort to the search for materials.
Finally, Mr. Hugh Howard, Mrs. Patricia Tugwell, and Mrs. Velma Jones at the
Pentagon Library and archivists Mr. Edward 3. Reese, Mr. Wilbert B. Mahoney, and
Ms. Teresa Hammet at the Modern Military Branch of the National Archives and
Records Administration provided valuable research assistance in my search for
pertinent World War II records. Special thanks is due to these competent librarians
and archivists for their continued professional service to demanding historians as
myself.

All those who read and reread drafts of the manuscript deserve more
recognition than given in these few lines of credit. Much thanks will remain in my
heart. Nevertheless, my appreciation extends to many colleagues at the Center of
Military History: Dr. David F. Trask; Lt. Col. Robert Frank; Dr. Alexander S.
Cochran, Jr. ; Maj. Bruce Pirnie; Dr. Edgar F. Raines, Jr.; Lt. Col. David Campbell;
Maj. Lawrence M. Greenberg; Maj. Francis T. Julia, Jr.; and Dr. Paul J. Scheips,
who kept me honest with the Army viewpoint and corrected by grammar. At the
Office of Air Force History important readers and advisers included Col. Fred
Shiner, Mr. Herman Wolk, Dr. B. Franklin Cooling, Dr. George Watson, and Dr.
Wayne Thompson. They all expended great energy and time in their critiques of

the manuscript. Additional advice was continually sought from Dr. Fred Beck, Dr.
Walton Moody, Lt. Col. Vance Mitchell, and Maj. John Kreis, whose knowledgeable
minds helped expand my understanding of the very complicated events of World
War II Washington and North Africa.

The individuals involved in the preparation of this study for publication also
deserve special mention. At the Air Force they include: Dr. Fred Beck, Mrs. Anne
E. Andarcia, Ms. Vanessa Allen, Mr. David Chenoweth, Ms. Laura L. Hutchinson,
and Mr. Ray Del Villar. At the Army they include: Mr. John W. Elsberg; Mr.
Arthur S. Hardyman; Ms. Linda M. Cajka who prepared the charts, maps,
illustrations, and the cover; Mr. Robert J. Anzelmo, my editor; and last but really
first, my project editor, Ms. Joanne M. Brignolo.

As expected, this writer takes full responsibility for interpretations,
omissions, and errors of fact.

Washington, D.C. DANIEL R. MORTENSEN

1 August 1987

vii

CONTENTS

PROLOGUE 3

Chapter

I. ORGANIZATION, DOCTRINE, AND WEAPONS FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT . . 6

The Interwar Years 6

Increasing Influence of the Air Arm, 1938-19*2 9

Requirements for Hemisphere Defense 11

Requirements for War With the Axis 13

Doctrine for War 20

Aircraft: Enabling the Execution of Close Air Support 24

II. NORTH AFRICAN CLOSE AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS 47

World War II Operations and North Africa 47

Planning Close Air Support for North Africa 50

Operations: TORCH Landings and the Offensive Against Tunisia 56

Operations: Reorganization and the Second Tunisian Offensive 62

Operations: Kasserine and a New Look at Close Air Support 70

Close Air Support After Kasserine 83

EPILOGUE 94

viii

MAPS

No. Page

1. North Africa and the Mediterranean, 1942-1943 48

2. TORCH Landings in Northwest Africa, 8 November 1942 54

3. First Action in Tunisia, 16-23 November 1942 58

4. Comparative Distances of Allied and Axis Airfields, December 1942 ..... 60

5. American Battlefield in Southern Tunisia 64

CHARTS

1. Channels of Tactical Control of Combat Aviation in Typified

Air Support Command 21

2. Allied Command Relationships in North Africa and the

Mediterranean, March 1943 74

ILLUSTRATIONS

1. Curtiss A-18s 29

2. Douglas A-20 29

3. Douglas B-18s 30

4. Martin A-22 30

5. Northrop A- 17 31

6. North American B-25 "Mitchell" 32

7. Martin B-26 "Maurader" 32

8. Douglas 0-43 33

9. North American 0-47 34

10. Curtiss 0-52 34

No . Page

11. Taylorcraft 0-57 35

12. Stinson 0-f9 36

13. RyanO-51 . 36

H. Lockheed P-38 "Lightning" 37

15. Bell P-39 "Airacobra" 37

1 6. Curtiss P-40 "Kittyhawk" 38

17. North American A-36 38

18. Douglas A-2^ 39

19. Curtiss A-25 39

20. Curtiss C-46 "Commando" 40

21. Douglas C-47 "Gooney Bird" 40

22. Air Superiority 80

23. Interdiction 81

2<f. Close Air Support 82

Unless otherwise indicated, all illustrations are from U.S. Air Force files.

A PATTERN FOR JOINT OPERATIONS:
WORLD WAR II CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, NORTH AFRICA

PROLOGUE

During World War II (1939-45), as today, close air support had a special
notoriety among the many tactical aviation missions. An investigation of events
and issues significant to close air support should illustrate its importance in modern
warfare, as well as its complex nature that caused great command problems during
battlefield operations. Close air support was affected by rapidly changing world
events as the nation's military focus shifted from a peacetime to prewar status — a
position of cautious defensiveness that involved preparing for a hemisphere
defense — and then, in December 1941, from a prewar to wartime status— a position
of total of fensiveness in Europe and the Far East. Other factors affecting the
importance and effectiveness of close air support included the accelerating
incidence of mobility, mechanization, and firepower in military operations
concepts; the performance of improved aircraft; and the decisions to make greater
use of air resources in battle. Close air support issues that captured the greatest
attention of the War Department staff and field commanders were usually
concerned with identifying aircraft and personnel resources, and their subsequent
allocation and control. The latter was especially important in terms of target and
mission selection. Most air force leaders felt that air resources could contribute
more if used to attack enemy aircraft and ground targets away from the heavily
defended battlefield. Most field commanders wanted control of air firepower so
that they could mass forces for the ground battle; they wanted close support
aviation resources, particularly observation and defensive fighter aircraft, to be
considered organic to the battlefield and to be commanded by field commanders.
While close air support produced and symbolized a struggle between the air and
ground arms of the Army, the senior leaders sought to counterbalance the
divisiveness by fostering the idea that subordinate commanders must encourage
consensus, cohesion, and cooperation. There were challenges enough just learning
to cooperate with the Allies on the ultimate defeat of a determined enemy.
Branches of the Army should work toward an effective command front. The
problems and compromises that followed indicate that this story of close air
support during World War II has a very modern flavor and relevance.

In the late 1930s close air support was meshed into a general category known

in the prewar doctrinal manuals as "aviation in support of ground forces."* Tactical
aviation, then, included all the specialties that, even today, support the ground
forces. Tasks included troop transport, air supply, long-distance reconnaissance,
defending against enemy aircraft (especially by maintaining air superiority), and
disruption of enemy supply and communications, as well as the tactical tasks
associated with close air support. The latter included battlefield observation and
liaison, defense of the battlefield and friendly territory from enemy aircraft, and
bombing and strafing of enemy forces and weapons in the immediate vicinity of
battlefield operations. With a change in the military mission to fit Western
Hemisphere defense priorities by 1939, and with the development of faster and
bigger aircraft, the War Department modified the concepts for employment of
tactical aviation. Close air support, in particular, was devalued in doctrinal
statements.

After September 1939, as war ensued in Western Europe, the ground arms of
the Army saw a greater need for all kinds of air support and, in thus subsequently
stressed their desire for close air support. This happened at a time when the air
arm thinking and aviation technology suggested that aircraft operations over the
modern battlefield would not be effective or practical. Aircraft were too
vulnerable to enemy antiaircraft fire and could not be easily replaced. Close air
support became even more marked as a particularly distinctive, troublesome, and
complex issue. Even with advancing technology, designing support aircraft proved
difficult. Disagreement and debate about doctrine increased; consequently,

*The prewar and early war manuals did not use the term "close air support." See
Air Corps Field Manual 1-5, Employment of Aviation of the Army, 15 April 1940,
which suggested support aviation is poorly suited for direct attacks. "The hostile
rear area is the normal zone of action of support aviation. . . ." War Department
Training Circular, The Army Air Force— Basic Doctrine, 24 July 1941, declared
that operations "in close co-operation with the other arms of the mobile Army"
were secondary to interdiction and air superiority missions against invaders of the
Western Hemisphere; and War Department Basic Field Manual 31-35, Aviation in
Support of the Ground Forces, 9 April 1942, discussed "immediate" and "more
distant" targets. Reports from air-ground tests held as early as January 1941
suggested that the airmen and ground force leaders both understood the modern
limits and capabilities of close support aviation. They argued among themselves
over the implications of a War Department directive that called for compromise
and cooperation in modernizing air-ground doctrine.

development of operational procedures stalled in long debates that could not be
satisfied in the many field exercises held to test the debated doctrinal ideas. All
the while air leaders gained a greater say about aviation matters, both those
dealing with support of ground operations and those connected to strategic air
warfare operations. Whatever the Army Air Forces mission, its rising influence
and growing independence challenged the cohesion of command and pointed to the
need for a new consensus among coequal air and ground component commanders.

CHAPTER I

Organization, Doctrine, and Weapons for Close
Air Support

The Infer war Years

In the interwar years (1919-38) the United States Army Air Corps considered
general air support of ground forces a prime mission function. Air support aviation
underwent dramatic changes in these years as airmen and other military and
civilian thinkers offered new ideas on the application of air power to warfare.
Students and faculty, thinking about air doctrine at the Air Corps Tactical School,
Maxwell Field, Alabama, represented the air arm's greatest effort to project
aviation into modern warfare. Because of their concern with air support, the
scholars at Maxwell outlined battlefield tactics that combined aircraft, tanks,
trucks, and mobile field artillery. By 1935 the close air support facet of air
support became diffused in a broader, multipurpose conceptualization of air
support for the ground, one that included interdiction and air defense roles. The
Maxwell scholars began pointing to some revolutionary changes in control of air
support aviation: airmen centrally controlling air assets in support of the ground;
the air commander not necessarily auxiliary to the ground force commander; and
the air force as a full combat arm, coordinate with the Army. With the rise of
deadly antiaircraft fire, airmen began to discount their ability to provide close air
support.*

New mission potentials for aviation, especially coastal defense and long-
range bombing tasks, promised further absorption of air support resources. Quite
often Air Corps ideas, especially those dealing with independent strategic missions,
ran counter to concepts developed at the Army Command and General Staff School
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the Army War College, then in Washington. One
idea explored by the airmen at Maxwell and credited to William Mitchell was that
bombers alone could stop a naval force. Another, attributed to the famed Italian
prophet of the air Giulio Douhet, suggested that fleets of bombers, air power alone,
could force an enemy nation to surrender. ?

As with air arm officers, the ground officers thought about the new
mechanization of war. Vigorous debate occurred between air and ground officers,
one time in public, as in the Billy Mitchell case. Occasionally the discussion
suggested to other branches of the Army that the Air Corps was reluctant about air

support in general, not close air support alone. For the most part, ground leaders
firmly held to the traditional concept that a ground army was necessary to defeat
an enemy force and capture territory; the air arm was primarily an auxiliary force
to further the ground force mission. Through the mid-thirties ground officers,
having the advantage of tenure, held the leadership mantle in the General Staff and
in the field. Although some of these ground staff officers understood the changes
in aviation and although some air doctrine that Air Corps leaders regarded as
progressive was published, ground-oriented sensibilities controlled the publication
of War Department doctrine. Generally, combat arms schools chose not to include
even the most elementary new air power thinking in their curriculum, forestalling
the education of ground officers at a time when air force roles were gaining
importance in military forces worldwide. By the mid-thirties leaders of the Army
General Staff, intent on preparing an army for quick mobilization in case of
invasion, gave the Air Corps responsibility to organize a combat ready air force. In
1935 the Air Corps organized the General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force to carry
out the function. 3

In the minds of some ground officers, giving airmen greater command and
control authority for a long strike or bombing force only sharpened their desire to
control all air functions. But the formation of GHQ Air Force did not include
independence comparable to that of the Royal Air Force. GHQ Air Force was
subordinate to the Army chief of staff, or his field commander in case of overseas
activity.'* A new training regulation, TR 440-15, Employment of the Air Forces of
the Army, 15 October 1935, codified the new Air Corps mission, but also showed
how a compromise had been worked out between extreme air and ground views on
air arm operational independence. If the air forces might conduct air operations in
an independent manner against an invading force before ground armies made
contact, TR 440-15 reaffirmed Army doctrine that "air forces further the mission
of the territorial or tactical commander to which they are assigned or attached." 5

More important to understanding the changing concept of close air support,
publication of TR 440-15 represented clear concessions to the air doctrine
developed over the years at the Air Corps Tactical School. Employment principles
discussed in the manual included: emphasis on offensive action, need for central
coordination of resources, constant and primary attention to destruction of the

enemy's air force, priority for preparation of air forces that would usually precede
ground forces into battle, and expectation that air forces would be concentrated
against a primary objective "not dispersed or dissipated in minor or secondary
operations." 6

So that the strength of the air forces would not be frittered away, the
regulation contained a corollary principle, long promoted by the air forces,
cautioning against operations over the battlefield. Enemy troops would be securely
fortified and protected against enemy air with effective antiaircraft guns. Ground
support operations could be conducted rather in an air defense mode, protecting
troops against enemy aircraft. Air operations could interdict concentration of
enemy forces, attack communications and ammunition dumps, and harass the
enemy's retreat. A primary concern of the ground commanders, to have bombing
forces available to attack a dug-in enemy or an enemy artillery piece, was not
addressed. Even observation operations in the immediate battle areas were not
stipulated in the regulation. That commanders in the field would have to interpret
the regulations was clearly intended. The Air Corps' unofficial doctrine had not
won full acceptance; but, for the first time, the War Department had opened the
door. 7

In the late thirties the subject of close air support continued to be secondary
to more important problems of national war planning. For example, the attention
given to the rise of Adolf Hitler's power in Germany and the close association
among Germany, Italy, and Japan in 1938 pointed doctrinal thinking towards a
different defense concern. War planners feared that an unfriendly foreign power
would use Canada or a South American nation as a jumping board to an invasion of
the United States. The air arm began to concentrate offensive planning for
operations against such an enemy force in the Western Hemisphere. The Air Corps
Tactical School instruction increasingly emphasized the importance of long-range
bombers, independent strike forces, and industrial targeting.

Air planners worried about close air support aircraft, and directed their
concern towards finding an aircraft that would be compatible with modern
European war practices. The main experimental attention was given to bigger and
faster "attack" types. New models would carry more munitions and have greater
speed and defensive armament. This kind of aircraft meant obsolescence of the

traditional close support role—flying low and slow to find precise targets, yet still
avoiding enemy guns. In the new operational parameters, the latest attack aircraft
would not be able to hit the precise targets usually associated with close support
aviation. The Air Corps could find no satisfactory airplane type to provide that
close-in service desired by the infantry commander on the battlefield.^

Increasing Influence of the Air Arm, 1938-1942

In November 1938, concerned about Hitler's bullying of major European
nations at Munich to gain the Sudetenland for Germany, and the expansion and
quality of European air forces, President Franklin D. Roosevelt opened wide the
door to an Army aviation revolution. Whatever the views of the War Department,
the president wanted to comply with English and French requests for American
aircraft, and he thought by expanding the Air Corps the aircraft industry would
produce more for everyone. On the fourteenth he called a group of his military
leaders to the White House. Generals Malin Craig, Army chief of staff, George C.
Marshall, deputy chief of staff, and Henry H. Arnold, chief of the Air Corps, were
among those summoned. The president said he wanted an appropriate force for
protection of the Western Hemisphere against the menacing intentions of Germany
and Italy. He wanted the Army Air Corps, modernized with the latest combat
aircraft, to be that force. 9

If there was ever an event that changed World War II close air support, this
was it. Congress debated the aviation issue for a few months, and then in early
1939 it gave the Air Corps the first in a series of very large budget increases. The
presidential and congressional attention helped inflate Air Corps prestige, giving it
special rank among the Army combat arms. The new status pointed to prospective
independence from a subordinate position in a field army, and fostered a view that
air-ground operations would have to be thought of in terms of joint command
relations. At the very least, the new influence gave the Air Corps greater leverage
to argue its view of ground support aviation as well as other military aviation
functions. 10

The case for the air arm did not develop without counterarguments. For one,
the War Department convinced Congress to increase spending for all military
forces. In 1939 Congress appropriated large sums for Army expansion and

modernization, as well as for aviation. Secondly, with the onset of World War II in
September the ground force leaders, impressed by the extensive use of aircraft in
the warfare, increasingly desired more aircraft as they updated ground warfare
plans. When the part played by the dive bombers in the stunning German Army
victories was publicized, the ground arms raised their demand for air support and
specialized aircraft for close air support. Diverging viewpoints, strongly
expressed, called for concession and accommodation. 11

General Marshall's leadership did not antagonize the air officers, as did some
of his chief of staff predecessors. From the airmen's point of view, Marshall was a
true leader of a modern air-ground team. He stood out as a promoter of
compromise and cooperation in this time of rapid change in ground and air
relationships. He helped institutionalize some differences within the General Staff
so that debates were not always publicized as interbranch struggles. Some issues
had interbranch proponents and opponents: ground as well as air officers who
wanted greater attention given to close air support versus their counterparts who
accepted emphasis on interdiction; or advocates for centralized control versus
those who wanted air assets controlled at a lower command level.

Marshall understood more about aviation than most ground generals. Over
the years he had been a student of air power. In 1938, when he first arrived in
Washington, he accompanied Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, then commander of the
GHQ Air Force (the operational command of the Air Corps) on a tour of
continental air facilities. As deputy chief of staff, in 1939, he and Chief of the Air
Corps Arnold, together, "worked out the details of an entire air plan for the War
Department." 12 When he assumed chief of staff duties in September 1939,
Marshall gave positions on the Army General Staff to large numbers of air officers.
As well respected as he was, the appointment of Andrews as assistant chief of staff
for operations (G-3), then later as commander of the Panama Defense Command,
turned heads among old Army leaders. Andrews became the first air officer to
hold the positions normally given to ground officers. Marshall made it a point to
appoint staff officers and field commanders who knew about the changes in air
warfare. 13

Working hard to reconcile the differences between air and ground officers,
Marshall took the position that the air forces needed to operate with a large degree

of autonomy. He validated the functional distinctiveness of and gave great
independence to the air forces when he approved an Air Staff for Arnold. In 19<fQ
and 19M he and Arnold saw eye-to-eye on the long-argued issue of independence
for air forces. While many air advocates, in and out of the military, urged
independence along the Royal Air Force model, Marshall and Arnold agreed that
existing war conditions prevented such a radical reorganization. Still, with the
rapid growth of the Army, these leaders understood the need to rely on
subordinates, and they gave the staff officers lots of rein and field commanders
increased autonomy— supplementary prerogatives of command—especially in
operational matters. Arnold kept his word, not advocating an independent
organization for the air forces while war continued. It was only natural for him,
however, to work consistently for greater influence of the air arm. Technically,
Arnold had no command authority over field operations, but found enough
flexibility in the wartime Army General Staff and field commands to affect air
operations around the world. The rising stock of aviation gave him, and other air
leaders, more say in the development of air-ground doctrine. 1*

Requirements for Hemisphere Defense

The German attack on Poland in September 1939 vitalized military thinking
about air warfare and particularly sharpened interest in support aviation. The War
Department sent officers of all grades and branches to Europe to observe events
and send back reports. Concurrent with events in Poland, Harry H. Woodring, the
secretary of war, named Arnold to form a board of officers, representing the
various Army branches, and to report on the projected employment of an air force.
On 1 September the body produced the Air Board Report. Shortly thereafter,
Marshall asked for a new statement of air doctrine based on this report. When it
was published the following spring, the Air Corps Field Manual (FM) 1-5,
Employment of Aviation of the Army, was essentially, like the Air Board Report, a
compromise document. It referred to major Air Corps principles, such as the need
for air superiority and centralized command. The traditional principle of air
warfare as an offensive weapon was not emphasized because war planning was still
geared to the likelihood of a Western Hemisphere defense. The function of

reconnaissance and liaison air units continued to be that of supporting the ground
forces, and the air units retained their permanent assignment under ground force
commands. The manual also identified the major air missions for combat or
weapons-carrying aircraft under the GHQ Air Force. Along with long-range
offensive strikes, air defense against enemy air forces, and miscellaneous patrol
and escort functions, the manual listed air support tasks of deep interdiction and
"air operations in immediate support of ground forces." 15

The ground branches' views were also included in FM 1-5. The air forces
were clearly divided by specialized function, including specially identified support
units, to prevent the GHQ Air Force from overlooking ground support missions as
seemed possible with long-range bombardment strike tasks being assigned high
priority. The ground officers did not want air units being detached from the GHQ
Air Force at the last minute. Rather, they wanted a support aviation force
identified as a theater of operations weapon, generally tasked by the higher theater
commander. Because in the Western Hemisphere defense war planning ground
action was less probable, the ground forces accepted forming a small cadre air
support force. This support force would be formed into "a nucleus of aviation
especially trained in direct support of ground troops and designated for rapid
expansion to meet war requirements. In peacetime this aviation will serve as a
small, immediately available force for use in minor emergencies and as a
laboratory for the continuous development of methods for its employment." 16

The Air Corps also gained exposure for its views in this 19^0 field manual.
FM 1-5 included surprisingly modern air support concepts, some of which would be
shelved when the forces organized for the first test of battle in North Africa. For
example, a "two-hatted" concept was employed to explain the air leader's
simultaneous command of air units and service to the ground commander. "As a
commander, he commands all Air Corps troops. ... As a staff officer, he is the
immediate assistant to the (ground) commander and adviser of his staff on all
aviation matters." The manual recognized the weakness of aviation in attacking
battlefront enemy troops. "Support aviation is not employed against objectives
which can be effectively engaged by available ground weapons . . . , [and] aviation
is poorly suited for direct attacks against small detachments or troops which are

well entrenched or disposed." The manual suggested that the maximum
effectiveness of support aviation "is secured through centralized control." Further,
"combined operations of air and ground forces must be closely coordinated by the
commander of the combined force and all operations conducted in accordance with
a well-defined plan." Then, recognizing the constraint of limited air resources, the
manual stated that operations in immediate support of ground forces are conducted
during the critical phases of combat and prior to and at the conclusion of battle." 17

Requirements for War With the Axis

Enunciating principles of close air support in April 1940 did not address the
complex details and problems of joint air-ground cooperation. The success of
Germany's combined arms— first in Poland, then in Western Europe during the
spring of 19^0 — encouraged Congress to support further air force expansion and
reorganization and a reevaluation of tactical doctrine. A force in being needed
more specific procedures for joint operations than were outlined in FM 1-5.
Marshall directed Andrews and his G-3 staff to study the issue anew. In September
Andrews issued a memorandum that listed five kinds of air support for ground
forces: close air support, air defense of friendly forces and installations, rear area
attack, paratroop support, and reconnaissance services. Andrews recommended
joint air-ground tests to evaluate the concepts, especially the first two, which
required the greatest effort in coordination. After a struggle over timing of
exercises, Marshall directed Lt. Gen. Lesley 3. McNair, chief of staff of GHQ (a
commander's headquarters for all field forces), to conduct a series of exercises.

From 19^1 to 1944, as commander of GHQ and Army Ground Forces, McNair
was responsible, with Arnold, for joint development of air support, tactical training
and doctrine. McNair organized exercises that brought together various air and
ground units to experiment with timing and innovative team combinations. More
than other Army training or operations officers, he promoted teamwork and
cooperation. More than most, he patiently suffered through the continuing
teething problems generated by the joining together of the different combat arms.
He criticized self-serving attitudes from the air and ground branches. He was
especially disturbed by the air force tendency towards independence. He

repudiated the view of some air officers that the air arm could win a war by itself,
thereby justifying independence. He also opposed division commanders who
demanded control of their own air resources, and he relentlessly endorsed the
unity-of-command principle.^

Marshall also advocated consistently the elementary Army concept that unity
of command was paramount for success in battle. Lessons of war suggested to him
the need for a unified command structure. He remarked that the German victories
in Poland and the Low Countries were founded on "creation of a single high
military command for all forces, whether of the land, sea or the air. ... In fact
the key to the military success of Germany in the present war has not been the
operation of the air forces on an independent basis but rather the subordination of
air power to the supreme command of the armed forces. , . i*f

Arnold believed that strategic bombardment should be a primary ingredient in
the battle with the Axis powers, but he too espoused unity of command, although
perhaps never with the fervor of a potential field or theater commander, such as
McNair and Marshall, and certainly with a different definition of centralized
command in the separate arms. Arnold made persistent efforts to satisfy ground
force complaints and solve air support problems. As with Marshall and other
commanding officers, he had many essential tasks to perform, and close air support
was only one of the air facets that crossed his desk. One example of his concern
occurred in 1941, when the Army Air Forces was created to give the air forces
greater autonomy. Against the advice of staff members, Arnold designated, for
the first time in air arm history, a formal advocate for air support. Col. William E.
Lynd became the first head of the Air Support Section of the Air Force Combat
Command (successor to the GHQ Air Force in June 1941). He could focus attention
towards the air-ground team when most needed, just as the rising expectations for
war and emphasis in air matters turned towards strategic air warfare.^

With the dramatic force expansion in 1941 and reorganizations necessary to
improve command and control, Arnold identified a distinct organization for air
support. In the new organization the Army Air Forces copied the British idea of
numbered air forces "on a Theater of Operations principle," to provide higher-
echelon leadership. These air forces would contain specific types of commands,
such as bomber commands and fighter commands. The command organization

reflected the hope that placing aircraft types together would simplify training,
maintenance, and logistics.

The new organization included "air support commands" to "secure the closest
type of cooperation with the ground forces." 21 Initially, the air support commands
were filled only with air units providing battlefield observation services. Later,
in 19^2, fighters, dive bombers, and medium and light bombers were placed under
the air support command structure to improve air support capability. At GHQ
McNair accepted the principles of flexibility and massing of forces, which the air
forces stressed; but, with the emergence of mechanized warfare, he worried about
specialization in the air and ground arms. He felt that the inclusion of different
types of aircraft, as well as the variable unit combinations, added to command
confusion. 22 For a number of months McNair was unhappy with formation of the
air support commands, which he declared was "one more step in the separation of
the air from the rest of the Army." 2 3

Lt. Gen. D. C. Emmons, commander of Air Force Combat Command, felt
otherwise. He envisioned an air-ground section of a proposed air support command
headquarters being physically located with McNair at GHQ. In addition, he
proposed that cooperation would be enhanced by locating subordinate air support
commands "at airdromes nearest to the headquarters of the forces with which they
will work." 2 * Further study by the General Staff and the Air Council* confirmed
that this organization, with its staff and command, was suitable to overcome the
reservations of the ground forces. McNair and air staff officers also agreed that
air support service entailed more than just air support command operations and
that "all classes of combat aviation of the Army Air Forces must be trained and
indoctrinated in performance of the Air Force mission, and in support of the ground
and naval forces." 2 ^ The directive that approved the air support commands stated
that not only would all aircraft types and units "be trained and used in the support

*Formed in March 19<tl along with the Army Air Forces, the council's function was
to review and coordinate major aviation projects. It consisted of the assistant
secretary of war for air, the chief of Army Air Forces, the chief of the War Plans
Division of the General Staff, the chief of the Air Corps, the commanding general
of the Air Force Combat Command, and others as appointed by the secretary of
war.

of ground forces" but that units organic to the air support commands would not
"constitute the sole air support of the ground operations." 26

While the War Department expected the reorganization of the Army Air
Forces to improve air-ground cooperation, events pointed to a reduced potential
for the close air support facet of air support. In the fall of 19<tl the War
Department transferred some aviation observation and liaison units and their
functions to the operational control of field artillery commands. Only procurement
and major maintenance of these units were kept under Army Air Forces
responsibility. Not only would the Army Air Forces be less involved in the close air
support aspect by transfer of observation units to artillery, but reports from
Europe encouraged the Army Air Forces to begin allocating fast fighters and
bombers to observation units that they still controlled. The faster aircraft
suggested less capability for covering the small-scale, individualized target
assignments requested by the ground commanders.

Organization of the theater-echelon air forces— the Twelfth Air Force as an
example— and their wide variety of air missions presented a probability of reduced
close air support capability. All types of combat commands and all major combat
types of aircraft were included in these numbered air forces. How the increased
importance of the theater echelon diminished prospects for close air support can be
illustrated by Marshall's air policy statement in 19*1. In his list of "Basic
Principles of Employment of the Air Component of the Army in the Order of Their
Priority" close air support ranked fifth in priority out of seven potential missions.
Interdiction of enemy armies and air forces, air superiority, and attack on enemy
shipping had higher priorities than "close cooperation with other arms of the mobile
army. . . ," 27 While Marshall's statement was made with reference to Western
Hemisphere defense thinking, the turn to European war planning did not necessarily
signify a change in the falling priority of close air support. 28

Battlefield commanders faced a situation where their supporting air
resources were controlled at a higher-echelon command that had different
priorities. Control of most air units in a theater was projected as the domain of
the theater commanders. This included transports for dropping paratroopers and
supplies; observation aircraft to provide theater observation, reconnaissance, and

liaison; and the combat bombers and fighters to attack enemy aviation, troop
centers, and communication choke points, as well as enemy troops on the
immediate front of the ground forces. This left only the air support commands, of
uncertain constitution in 1941-42, to be controlled by battlefield commanders. 29

Air and ground leaders were uneasy at this division of air force resources.
For example, the assistant air chief of staff for plans, Brig. Gen. Orvil Anderson,
spoke for several leading airmen who felt that any division of the limited and
valued air resources weakened the military principle of mass employment. Ground
commanders in training argued for larger relative allocation of resources for the
air support commands. Now—and throughout the war— Army field commanders and
staff officers, in training and combat, complained that the Army Air Forces failed

Testing of these concepts during the series of War Department maneuvers in
1941 was hurt by a shortfall of aircraft and trained squadrons. The maneuver
planners, air-ground coordinators, and troop commanders were frustrated when the
Army Air Forces did not provide adequate numbers of aircraft for practical testing
of air support coordination. McNair also noted that the ground forces failed to
employ the limited number of available aircraft realistically. Arnold explained
that diverting squadrons from training to the maneuvers would seriously delay
training schedules. Ground force planners were not conscious of the requirements
of a year-long training program, just for basic pilot instruction. Marshall sided
with Arnold but ordered him to compromise and strip some aircraft and personnel
from training squadrons. The exercises became more complex through the summer
and fall, but ultimately no one was satisfied with the artificiality of aircraft
employment, even in the important Louisiana and Carolina maneuvers in late

As exercise director, McNair now appreciated the necessity for the air and
ground forces to emphasize basic instructions within their respective branches in
the months ahead. He accepted the idea that pilots had to learn to fly and shoot
before training with the ground troops. In December 1941 he and Arnold proposed
another series of maneuvers for 1942 to exercise the joint air-ground relationship.
The declaration of war abruptly curtailed these plans, as well as many other plans
for a smooth buildup of forces.

Air support command structure and concepts for close air support were
seriously disrupted throughout 1942. 32 Arnold noted in mid-February that close air
support units "are still wallowing around looking for someone who takes an interest
in them and in their activities." 33 Even as late as September, when large numbers
of forces were committed to combat, Maj. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, commander of
armored forces, told Arnold that there was no air-ground support training: "We are
simply puttering. Cannot something be done about it?" 3 '*

By late 19*2, as operations captured more firmly the attention of air and
ground staff planners and field commanders, a number of problems affected the
quality and quantity of air support. Roosevelt showed his support of the Allies by
calling for production of large quantities of American aircraft, thereby
constricting the flow of airplanes available to air force commands. With war
declared, air units were hurriedly concentrated and rearranged. Operational
necessities decimated air support and air cooperation demonstration units. For
example, the Army Air Forces disbanded the Third Air Support Command to help
fill the needs of the newly formed Eighth Air Force to be based in England. The
Army Air Forces eliminated the Fifth Air Support Command and redesignated it
the Ninth Air Force in April 19*2. The War Department removed two of the four
air support commands from training and put them into coastal patrol duties to help
combat the German submarine offensive against the East and Gulf Coasts.

Marshall, responding to organizational inadequacies revealed by the time of
Pearl Harbor, reorganized the General Staff in March 19*2. General Headquarters
became Army Ground Forces, and both the Army Ground Forces and Army Air
Forces gained greater independence of action. The reorganization also raised the
level of suspicion between air and ground officers. Ground officers knew that the
air force officers eyed jealously the British model for air-ground support. In the
Royal Air Force the air units were not attached to ground commanders at any
level. The air commander made the decisions on use of air support resources.

Air and ground leaders were also at odds over the air force insistence on
training bomber units in strategic and interdiction bombing techniques before
training them to support the ground forces. As a result, the Army Air Forces then
declared that with time running short, fighter and medium bomber pilots would not
receive army support training. The ground arms commands were also suspicious of

the name changes given to air units designated to provide close air support (ground-
air support command, ground support command, air support command). In turn,
some ground commanders asked for the formation of a dedicated ground support air
force, fearing that support would not come any other way. In spite of their felt
needs, this request suggested a lack of appreciation for the complexities of air
operations. It also went in the face of a principle held by some of the staff in
Washington that modern ground force units should be more flexible and less
encumbered with responsibilities, such as managing air unit operations. 3 ^

The air forces modified the types of aircraft assigned air support units
several times in 19^2, adding light bombers and then dive bombers, medium
bombers and fighters, giving the ground commander potential access to better
ground attack resources. But the problem of giving ground troops realistic air
support training continued through the remainder of 19^2. In reality, there simply
were not enough bases, aircraft, or time as the demands of war overrode
expectations of proper training. Even the air representatives at the growing
number of ground force schools and training facilities complained about poor air
support training exercises because of a deficiency in aircraft numbers.

McMair showed an appreciation of this dilemma, accepting the shortage
problem with aircraft and pilots. Arnold agreed that "priority commitments,
special diversions, and restricted flow of aircraft to Army Air Forces have
prevented [the] fullest desirable allocation of combat aviation for . . . Ground-Air
Support training." 3 *> Somewhat optimistically, Arnold and McNair saw
improvements for 19^3, but American forces were committed without realistic air-
ground training during the confused buildup subsequent to the invasion of North
Africa. 37

Many changes in Army aviation between mid-19^0 and mid-19^2 affected
close air support. Most important was acquisition of a strategic mission to bomb a
potential enemy's war-making industry that encouraged greater control of air
resources by airmen. A reorganization of air units into air forces similar to
European air force models not only precipitated greater centralized control by
airmen but also divided attention originally given to close air support and other
ground support matters. The airmen compensated by organizing both special air
support commands to consolidate units providing close air support for the ground

forces and by forming a headquarters staff office dedicated to air support and
relations between air and ground arms. Air and ground leaders discussed the
meshing of forces in a potential European war scenario and the War Department
held exercises to test new theories. With time at a premium in 19<f2, subsequent to
the buildup of forces for operations, the War Department could not insist on
realistic air-ground training even if there was a great need for better
understanding between air and ground forces.

Doctrine for War

In spite of limitations, planners and commanders used the 1941 maneuvers as
the basis, along with observers' reports from Europe, for a final doctrinal
statement on air support prior to committing large numbers of American ground
forces to combat. As with FM 1-5 in the previous year, the new War Department
manual, FM 31-35, Aviation in Support of Ground Forces, published 9 April 19^2,
was a joint effort, produced by ground and air representatives. By contrast,
however, they were more concerned with the organization than with the techniques
of air support. They offered no plans for battlefield operations and no priority for
targets or missions. Finally, they equivocated about close air support: "Air
support targets on the immediate front or flanks of supported units are generally
transitory targets of opportunity." In this instance they recommended the dive
bomber as the proper aircraft type for close air support, although the air leaders
had clearly stated that the dive bomber would be ineffective in close air support
where the enemy had good defenses. The manual suggested that deep interdiction
targets were the airman's choice. 38

Neither were the manual writers clear about the sensitive aspects of the
command relationship in joint operations (Chart 1 ). In one aspect they were
relatively straightforward: He— that is, the air support commander— was "habitually
attached to or supports an army in the theater." Wearing the command hat, he had
direct control of all aircraft units, carrying out the general tasking orders from an
army or task force commander. Wearing the staff hat, he served as the army staff
air support specialist, giving advice and suggestions to the ground arm officers
about employment of aircraft in the ground operations. At both levels, command

Chart 1 — Channels of Tactical Control of Combat Aviation in Typified

Air Support Command

Air

Corps

Support
Control

1 Div

Air
Support
Parties

Normal ground force command

^— — — Air support control
----- Direct control

Source : War Department Basic Field Manual 31-35, Aviation in Support of Ground Forces, 9 Apr 42, p.4.

and staff, the air commander was allowed to practice his specialty, and mutual
understanding and cooperation was encouraged. According to the manual, "the
basis of effective air support of ground forces is teamwork. The air and ground
units in such operations in fact form a combat team. Each member of the team
must have the technical skill and training to enable it to perform its part in the
operation and a willingness to cooperate thoroughly."^

The problem of cooperative relationship among lower-echelon commanders
had proved to be the irresolvable issue, and here the manual writers were
ultimately and purposefully evasive. The Army Ground Forces field command
organization of army, corps, division, and combat teams was distinguishable from
the Army Air Forces command organization of numbered air force, air support
command, and bomber, fighter, and reconnaissaince groups and squadrons. Thus air
and ground organizations each had its own chain of command. Although ground and
air units exchanged liaison officers, by doctrine the lowest level of command
decisions were made (whether to fly a mission or not) at the army level. Below
that, subordinate ground commanders only requested, and not ordered, air support.
Except in rare cases when air units were temporarily attached to a ground unit, a
request for air support from a company on the line had to travel through battalion,
regimental, division, and corps command sections before it reached the army
commander or his delegated substitute, the air support commander, who could
authorize sending the fighter or bomber squadrons into action.*

This centralization of air command came out of a principle held by air force
officers — one that found air resources too valuable to lose in everyday operations.
They talked in terms of flexibility and mass employment. An air unit was an
expensive and vulnerable air resource requiring rationing by attachment to the
highest field command level. The rationale here was based on the reality that
close air support planes were expensive, nonexpendable machines and that pilots
were trained at great expense and time. A ground commander would not be able to
have his own air resources. By October 1941 McNair had accepted the
technological and training limitations of aviation, and he agreed that air resources
needed to be under central management. In addition, he argued for the
centralization concept, because central control was needed to attain air superiority
and because he feared lower-echelon commanders would waste resources. Thus he

fought against decentralization, favored by the field commanders, even though it
promised speedier response time. Indeed, ground commanders perceived the long
command and control communications chain in a centralized system as a guarantee
of slow air assistance.

Generally, the doctrine acknowledged that the air support commander was an
expert in aviation practices and that his airplanes, a scarce resource, would be
employed under his direction against the most important target of the ground unit
in combat, as decided by the highest ground level commander. In reaction,
subordinate field commanders tenaciously expressed dissatisfaction with the idea
that an airman at the army staff level had some control over the forces at the
corps or division level of battle. Their rationale was the need to ensure "unity of
command," wherein all resources, including aircraft, should be under the control of
a ground commander. The writers waffled here because they did not really know at
what level—division, corps, or army— the ground commander would be during
battle. The compromise doctrine, FM 31-35, offered neither true centralization
nor unity of command. The air and ground officers who wrote FM 31-35 understood
that it was theoretically based, that combat experience was needed to validate
doctrine, and that leaders would interpret it in light of specific campaigns.*^

Additional doctrine published before battle verification in North Africa
reflected the expanding importance and increased responsibilities for the air
forces. By 1942 there was the greater question of whether any new ideas could be
instilled in the minds of field commanders in the midst of preparation for combat.
A good example was FM 100-15, Larger Units, issued 29 June 1942. In this
document not only was a strategic mission formally established but also a priority
was set for one aspect of air support aviation that would restrict efforts at close
air support. The manual stated that in campaigns "the initial objective [of air
operations] must include the attainment of air superiority." Corps or division
commanders accepted the idea of air superiority as a high-priority mission for the
air forces, but they expected aircraft for close air support as well. Members of an
air support board met in December 1942 to suggest revisions, but the Army Air
Forces and Army Ground Forces members argued to delay publication of an
updated air support manual until differing concepts were more fully tested in
combat.^ 2

An additional issue was whether doctrine written by the headquarters staff in
1 942 could be disseminated to the field in time to educate and convince
regimental, brigade, division, and corps ground commanders, as well as the air
commanders of the squadrons, groups, and air commands. The record suggests that
indoctrination in air and ground force doctrine tended to be limited to an officer's
own arm. Even though it was crucial to close air support operations, neither air
nor ground officers gained effective knowledge of each other's branch doctrine
until mid-1943, when training programs became more realistic.*^

Aircraft: Enabling the Execution of Close Air Support

The War Department tackled one other major problem between air and
ground, choosing and procuring suitable close air support aircraft, in the prewar
period. Limited funding reduced research and development in the interwar years.
Then, in 1939, when war preparations opened the purse, the need for operational
aircraft was too urgent to start the acquisition process at the basic research level.
Lacking many modern aircraft in 1939, the Air Corps now scurried to procure the
latest models of all available types. It was forced to rely on the self-initiated
design of the aircraft manufacturers. Fortunately, the American aviation industry
had been competitive internationally and had done design work on many up-to-date
aircraft. The American commercial market and the foreign military market had
encouraged research for several years prior to 1939. In particular, the American
industries developed radial engines superior to any of European design, and had
built superior transport aircraft. In the late thirties, with relatively short
development time, the industry modified many of its transport aircraft into light
and medium bombers and offered them to foreign and American military
organizations.**

Design and development of new bombers was one thing; aviation technology
was such that engineers could readily produce bigger and taster aircraft. However,
aircraft for close support, particularly observation and attack types, had
operational requirements that called for characteristics more difficult to produce
than size and speed. Aviation engineers in the United States and in foreign
countries had failed to find the technology to match those characteristics, and all

observation and attack aircraft between 1939 and 19*3, American and foreign,
were considered obsolete. For aviation technologists, the air battles of 1939 and
19*0 in Europe demonstrated that the very latest Air Corps attack and observation
models were excessively vulnerable to the speed and guns of fighters and to general
ground fire. German light flak (antiaircraft) guns proved so effective that the
interwar approach of sneaking into a ground target, flying low and slow between
ground obstructions, was no longer possible. In short, the prospect seemed dim for
development of an effective weapons-carrying attack plane or observation model
for close air support.

Faced with the five-year timelag between design and construction, Arnold
was forced to make an important procurement decision in 1939. He started a
revolution in attack bombardment doctrine in choosing the Douglas A-20, one of
many new light bomber designs offered by the manufacturers, over the more
simple, traditional, single engine attack aircraft that could hit small targets
identified by the ground commanders. His decision demonstrated the growing
popularity of light bomber procurement by European air forces in the immediate
months before the invasion of Poland. In doing so, Arnold assumed that the new,
larger-sized medium bombers, offered by manufacturers without Air Corps request,
might also prove useful for close air support. He expected that these new twin-
engined bombers would be fast enough and sufficiently armed to match enemy
fighters and that the remarkable speed provided by the new powerful engines would
allow aircraft to slip through antiaircraft defenses. Ground force proponents
feared that the new bombers were more suited to interdiction bombing and that
they would not be capable of hitting targets in close proximity to friendly troops.
Maj. Gen. Innis P. Swift, commander of the 1st Cavalry Division in 19*2, forwarded
a design proposal that was symbolic of the dream of all ground commanders. The
proposed aircraft matched all the needs of a weapons-carrying ground support
aircraft: long loitering capability, armor protection against ground weapons, and
ability to carry a suitable number of weapons and munitions. General Swift
understood, however, that success hung on the hope that engineers could develop an
engine with suitable horsepower. The Army Air Forces engineers put out bids for
such an aircraft, but a prototype was not found until after the war.

Procuring aircraft for the observation role was a more difficult problem than
procuring weapons-carrying aircraft, and resulted in years of wrangling between air
and ground staff and field proponents. Faced with the problem of the new, fast
enemy fighters and the requirement to maintain long loitering capabilities, aircraft
designers had an almost impossible technological task, The airmen rejected many
designs proposals offered by manufacturers. All proposals compromised speed and
defenses, even though most models would have provided good observation platforms
in peacetime. Somewhat selfishly, many ground officers felt that observation
problems stemmed from the airmen's self-serving concentration on bomber
development and that aircraft for close air support observation needs had been

After months of argument over several types of observation aircraft, in 19*1
the ground force planners demanded that a small, lightweight, off-the-shelf,
commercial model be procured for battlefield observation duties. The 19* i
maneuvers had shown the utility of small aircraft to ground commanders. Some
ground officers maintained that the little "Grasshoppers" would be able to observe
enemy activities while staying behind friendly lines in their flights. This way they
would avoid enemy ground fire. Supporters in the ground forces also believed that
the planes' maneuverability would allow them to dodge fighter pursuit. The airmen
never fully accepted the light aircraft as a battlefield weapon, but they saw no
alternative. Some "standard" observation models, such as the 0-*7 and 0-52
procured for testing between 1939 and 1941, were very fine aircraft in terms of
providing good loitering time and good observation for the observers. Yet by 19*1
the airmen had determined that they were too vulnerable, by European battlefield
standards, both to enemy fighters and ground fire. Instead, the airmen suggested
that deep penetration reconnaissance could be carried out by specially modified
fighters or fast bombers, and the small planes would be procured until they could
find a better close-in observation aircraft. * 6

Understanding many of the problems associated with acquiring suitable close
air support aircraft, and usually deferring to the airmen specialists, Marshall in one
instance interfered with an Army Air Forces decision. In 19*1 he asked the air
forces to acquire dive bombers similar to those used by the Germans. The Stuka
dive bombers had terrified enemy ground forces by providing precision

bombardment of targets close to German troops. Light bombers, using the level-
bombing attack mode, could not guarantee pinpoint target destruction. The German
dive bomber success captured everyone's attention, and army commanders wanted
similar air support. Many argued that this was the only remaining aircraft type
that gave field commanders hope for effective weapons-carrying close air support
aircraft.* 7

Arnold told Marshall that the Air Corps had tested the dive bomber concept
years earlier, rejecting it as dangerous and potentially ineffective because of
enemy fighters. He also told Marshall that German dive bombers had been proven
too vulnerable in battle, in spite of some success against Poland, France, and the
Soviet Union. The Germans had, in fact, comprehended the weakness of the type
and did not intend to employ the dive bombers in theaters where their enemy had
first-line fighters. Nonetheless, probably overly sensitive to the complaints of
ground forces and wanting to provide a surrogate, Marshall insisted. Arnold
complied by ordering the acquisition of dive bombers for the air support commands.
Because the Army Air Forces had neither dive bombers nor any in design, the air
staff ordered quantities of modified Navy models and had the first production P-51
fighters modified with dive brakes and wing racks to fill the requirement.

In 1940 and 1941 the identification of aircraft for close air support tasks held
the attention of both air and ground leaders. However, by 1942, they knew that the
performance of thier forces really would be tested in cooperative — joint —
operations of close air support. Limited time prevented careful study of
operational problems and weaknesses. A war-experienced Royal Air Force group
captain visiting the War Department predicted some possible problems with the
American air support system, especially with planning. He foresaw that Americans
would have to undertake more intensive planning and develop a permanent staff to
coordinate all the services and arms cooperating in air support. He suggested that
planners needed to recognize how quickly air forces were wasted away in battle
conditions. Maj. Gen. George C. Kenney, commanding the Fourth Air Force in San
Francisco, in April 1942, also offered some predictive observations. He warned
that air support would take lots of planes, for observation, attack, and top cover.
Any stinginess and the system would fail.*8

Some offices of the War Department made note of Kenney's admonitions, but
the preparation for an attack against the Nazis in Europe, as well as other theater
activities, engrossed much of the staff effort and consumed the attention of field
commanders desperately preparing their minimally trained troops for overseas
passage. By late 1942 the War Department had assigned the expanding air forces
many functions. Close air support of ground forces was but one troublesome aspect
of air power. Still, the ground leaders saw a great need for aircraft in the battle
against Axis powers, and they got assurance from the War Department that they
would have the air support commands dedicated to support the ground battle. They
also won the promise of potential support from fighter and bomber commands. War
Department leaders generally agreed on doctrine for joint arms warfare, written in
light of European war experiences, although there were questions about command
of forces at lower levels and about the indoctrination of field commanders. Arnold
admitted freely that the air forces were only partially trained. He foresaw
problems with close air support, as well as other facets of military activity, in
forthcoming operations in North Africa.^

Several twin-engined tactical bombers, modified from commerical transport aircraft, were offered by
the alert aircraft industry in the late thirties. Portrayed are Douglas B-18s (fop), shown here flying in
formation over California, and a Martin A-22 (fioffom) on the ramp.

A more conventional attack aircraft, the Northrop A-1 7. last of the prewar single-engine attack airplanes,
was a successful flyer and was much faster than its predecessors. A-1 7s were procured in great
quantity between 1936 and 1941 , but after the United States became involved in the war, it was clear
to all that this aircraft would be inadequate in speed, range, and bomb-carrying capability.

The Army Air Forces acquired two medium bombers beginning in 1941, the North American B-25
"Mitchell" (fop) and the Martin B-26 "Maurader" (ooffom), with the expectation of providing the ground
forces additional close air support as well as interdiction and strike missions.

The Air Corps bought dozens of different observation-type aircraft in the late thirties. Some were
modified from pursuit or attack aircraft types. Several, like this Douglas 0-43, were good observation
platforms, but the increasingly fast fighter aircraft beginning to fly in foreign air forces suggested that
conventional observation aircraft would be extremely vulnerable.

Then in the late thirties the Air Corps sought a more powerful, faster, all-metal monoplane type for
observation tasks. The North American 0-47 {top) and Curtiss 0-52 (bottom) were excellent flyers.
The 0-47 had an observation bay below the wing; the 0-52 used a high-wing configuration to allow
the flight crew an unobstructed view below.

The most popular observation aircraft of the war were the light "Grasshoppers," like this Taylorcraft
0-57- With only a 65-horsepower engine and simple construction, they were inexpensive and easy to
operate and maintain, but they could only operate behind friendly lines or when the skies were clear of
enemy fighters.

In addition, the Air Corps procured a number of light aircraft, basically modified from commercial sports
planes, to give the ground forces close air support service once air superiority had been gained. Some
of the models were highly maneuverable and performed well at slow speeds. The Stinson 0-49 {top)
was a successful model used throughout the war. The Ryan 0-51 [bottom) had high-lift wings that
permitted operations in and out of small fields.

To complement the light observation aircraft, airmen turned to modified fighters for the needed
observation over enemy lines. Once the lessons of battle came in, they also modified these planes
with bomb racks and operated them in close air support missions. Portrayed are two of the fighter
aircraft types of World War II that were modified into fighter-bombers, the Lockheed P-38 "Lightning"
(fop| and the Bell P-39 "Airacobra" (ijorfom).

Before 1 940 the Air Corps had many varieties of cargo transports to serve its own operational flying
squadrons. The famous Curtiss C-46 "Commando" (top) and the Douglas C-47 "Gooney Bird"
(bottom) were acquired in large numbers to meet the expanding requirements of all services. In close
air support tasks these aircraft provided the ground forces with both cargo and personnel airborne
transport.

Endnotes— Chapter I

1. Thomas H, Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air
Army, 1917-19*1 , USAF Historical Studies no. 89 (Maxwell Air Force Base;
USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, 1955),
pp. *0-*l.

2. Oral Interv no. 729, Gen Earle E. Partridge, April 197*, pp. 60-68 and 221-27
(Partridge claimed that there was a balanced curriculum at the Air Corps
Tactical School and that the air forces were organized for cooperation with
the Army ground forces), USAF Historical Research Center (USAFHRC) Oral
History Collection, Maxwell Air Force Base (MAFB); Maj Gen Orvil A.
Anderson, "Development of US Strategic Air Doctrine, ETO WW II" (Speech
delivered at Air War College, September 20, 1951), USAFHRC Microfilm
Collection, 239.71651-9, MAFB.

3. Greer, Air Doctrine , pp. **-106. See also Oral Intervs no. 729, Partridge,
April 197*, and no. 898, Maj Gen Orvil A. Anderson, October 1959, USAFHRC
Oral History Collection, MAFB; R. Earl McClendon, The Question of
Autonomy for the U.S. Air Army, 1907-19*5 (Maxwell Air Force Base:
Documentary Research Division, Air University, 195*), pp. 151-52; John F.
Shiner, Foulois and the U.S. Army Air Corps, 1931-1935 (Washington, D.C.:
Office of Air Force History, 1983), pp. * 3-255.

*. McClendon, Question of Autonomy , pp. 151-52.

5. Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking
in the United States Air Force (Maxwell Air Force Base; Air University,
197*), pp. *0-*l.

6. War Department Training Regulation **0-15, Air Corps, Employment of the
Air Forces of the Army, 15 Oct 35.

7. Ibid.

8. Greer, Air Doctrine , pp. 76-83 and 87-88. See also William A. Jacobs,
"Tactical Air Doctrine and AAF Close Air Support in the European Theater,
I94*-19*5," Aerospace Historian , March 1980, pp. 35-*9.

9. Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations . United
States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, U.S.
Army, 1950), pp. 132-*6.

10. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in
World War II , 7 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19*8-58), vol. 1,
Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 19*2 (19*8), p. 10*;
Futrell, Ideas , p. *9; H. H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper, 19*9),
pp. 177-80.

11. Craven and Gate, Plans and Early Operations , 1:10*; Arnold, Global Mission,
pp. 177-80; Maj Gen L. S. Kuter, "Organization of Top Echelons in World War
II" (Lecture delivered at War College, February 2S, 19<f9), pp. 2-6 (hereafter
cited as Kuter Lecture), USAFHRC Microfilm Collection, MAFB.

12. Arnold, Global Mission , p. 180.

13. Watson, Chief of Staff , pp. 77, 152-55, 162-78, Dewitt S. Copp, A Few Great
Captains (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, 1980), pp. *28 and *3*-37; George
Catlett Marshall, The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, ed, Larry I. Bland
(Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1981—), vol. 1, The Soldierly Spirit,
December 188Q-3une 1939 (1981), pp. 611, 617, 618, 620-2*; Forrest C.
Pogue, George C. Marshall (New York: Viking, 1963-87), vol. 2, Ordeal and
Hope, 1939-19*2 (1965), pp. *8-50 and 82-85; Harold B. Hinton, Air Victory:
The Men and Machines , (New York: Harper, 19*8), p. 87; Arnold, Global
Mission , p. 179; Memo, Gen Malin Craig, CofS, WD, to Asst CofS, G-2, WD,
17 Mar 39, file OCS 1*100-21, RG 165, National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA); Memo, Craig to Asst CofS, G-2, WD, 2* May 38, file
OCS 1*110-23, RG 165, NARA; Kuter Lecture, pp. 2-6.

1*. Ltr, Maj Gen H. H. Arnold, Chief, Air Corps, to Karl H. Von Weigand, Foreign
Service Editor, International New Service, 6 Mar 39, file 381, CDF 1939-
19*2, RG 18, NARA; Arnold, Global Mission , pp. 179-83; Futrell, Ideas , pp.
*S-*9; Marshall, Papers of George Catlett Marshall , 1:631-35; Copp, A Few
Great Captains , pp. **8-*9; Watson, Chief of Staff , pp. 280-86.

15. Quoted words from Air Corps Field Manual 1-5, Employment of Aviation of
15 Apr *0. See also Greer, Air Doctrine , pp. 112-15; Futrell, Ideas , p. 51.

16. Air Corps Field Manual 1-5, Employment of Aviation of the Army, 15 Apr *0.

17. Ibid.

18. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, The
Organization of Ground Combat Troops , United States Army in World War 11
(Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, U.S. Army, 19*7), pp. 99-107, 115-18,
13*- 39.

19. Watson, Chief of Staff , p. 29*.

20. Arnold, Global Mission , pp. 181-99; See Air Support Directorate,
HQAAF/AFRAS documents in files 373.21, AAF, CDF 19*2-19** and 321.9,
CDF 1939-19*2, RG 18, NARA. See also records in USAFHRC Microfilm
Collection, 1*3.0*-*, MAFB; Memo, Maj Gen George H. Brett, Chief, Air
Corps, to Asst CofS, WPD, WD, 5 Jun *1, sub: Air Force Requirements, files
*52.1, "F" Airplanes Reports, Entry 293, Series II, CDF 1939-19*2, RG 18,
NARA; Greenfield et al., Organization of Ground Combat Troops , pp. 99-101;
Watson, Chief of Staff , pp. 28*-95; Pogue, Ordeal and Hope , 2: 83-86.

21. Frank Robert Futrell, Command of Observation Aviation; A Study in Control
of Tactical Airpower , USAF Historical Study no. 24 (Maxwell Air Force Base:
USAF Historical Division, 1956), p. 12.

22. Ibid., pp. 1-21; Greenfield et al., Organization of Ground Combat Troops , p.
108; Memo, Lt Gen Detos C. Emmons, Cdr, HQ, Air Force Combat Command
(AFCC), to Chief, Army Air Forces (AAF), 3 Jul «, USAFHRC Microfilm
Collection, 322.082, MAFB; Craven and Cate, Plans and Early Operations , 1:
144 and 158-59; Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army
Air Forces in World War II , 7 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1948-58), vol. 6, Men and Planes (1955), pp. 52-55; "Cooperative Aviation:
Five Support Commands," The Air Corps News Letter , August 1941, pp. 1, 4,
30; Memo, George C. Marshall, CofS, WD, to Chief, Air Corps, 22 Jul 41,
USAFHRC Microfilm Collection, 145.96-63, MAFB; Ltr, Adjutant General,
WD, to Chief, AAF, 25 Jul 42, sub: Air Support Aviation, file 381, CDF 1939-
1942, RG 18, NARA; Minutes of Initial Meeting of Air Council, 2 Jul 41, War
Department, file 334.8, CDF 1939-1942, RG 18, NARA.

23. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Army Ground Forces and the Air-Ground Battle
Team, Including Organic Light Aviation , U.S. Army Study no. 35 (Washington,
D.C.: Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1948), p. 7.

24. Futrell, Command of Observation Aviation , p. 12.

25. Ibid.

26. Directive, Adjutant General, WD, to Chief, AAF, 25 Jul 41. sub: Air Support
Aviation, file 381, CDF 1939-1942, RG 18, NARA; Herman S. Wolk, Planning
and Organizing the Postwar Air Force, 1943-1947 (Washington, D.C.: Office
of Air Force History, 1984), pp. 21-22.

27. Memo for Chief of AAF (probably sent by Maj Gen Carl Spaatz, Asst CofS,
AAF), 22 Jul 41, USAFHRC Microfilm Collection, 145.96-63, MAFB.

28. Craven and Cate, Plans and Early Operations , 1:586-88; Memo, Col H. L.
George, Asst Air Chief of Staff, A-WPD, WD, to CofS, WD, 18 Feb 42, sub:
Readjustment of Air Support Organizations, USAFHRC Microfilm Collection,
145.96-63, MAFB; Memo, Col William E. Lynd, Director, Air Support, AFCC,
to CofS, AAF, 3 Feb 42, sub: Organization of Air Support, file 321.9, CDF
1939-1942, NARA; Memo, Col John Y. York, Jr., to Asst CofS, A-3, WD, 31
Mar 42, sub: Status of 5th Ground Support Command, file 321.9, CDF 1939-
1942, RG 18 NARA; 1st End, CG, Air Force Technical Training Command,
Knollwood Field, N.C., 4 Jul 42, sub: Ground-Air Support Command, to
Memo, Col D. M. Schlatter, Director, Ground-Air Support, WD, 4 July 42,
same sub, file 321.9, CDF 1939-1942, RG 18, NARA; Memo, Col B. E. Gates,
Director, Management Control, WD, to Director, Military Requirements, WD,
14 Jul 42, sub: Transfer of Functional Responsibility for Light and Dive
Bombardment . . . , file 452.1, CDF 1939-1942, RG 18, NARA; Memo (for

oral presentation), Brig Gen T. J. Hanley, Jr., to Arnold, 5 Nov 42, sub: Air
Support for Ground Forces, file 373.21, AAF CDF, Oct 1942 to May 1944, RG
18, NARA; Ltr (and attachments), Maj Gen George C. Kenney, Cdr, Fourth
Air Force, to Lt Gen H. H. Arnold, Cdr, AAF, 25 Apr 42, file 385C, CDF
1939-1942, RG 18, NARA.

29. Greenfield, Army Ground Forces and the Air- Ground Battle Team , p. 7.

30. Futrell, Ideas , pp. 77-78.

31. Memo, Emmons, Cdr, HQ, AFCC, to Chief, AAF, 8 Oct 41, file Chief of
AAF, Entry 241a, RG 18, NARA; Memo (and attached staff sheet), Arnold to
Asst SecWar John 3. McCloy, 15 Mar 42, H. H. Arnold Manuscript Collection,
box 44, Library of Congress (LOC); Greenfield et al., Organization of Ground
Troops , pp. 104-08.

32. Greenfield, Army Ground Forces and the Air-Ground Battle Team , pp. 7-9
and 29-44; Memo, Lynd, Director, Air Support, AFCC, to CofS, WD and AAF,
3 Feb 42, sub: Organization of Air Support, file 321.9, CDF 1939-1942, RG
18, NARA.

33. Memo, Schlatter, Office of Director of Ground-Air Support, WD, to Director,
Military Requirements, WD, 20 Apr 42, sub: Comments of General Brereton's
Cablegram; Memo, Arnold to Schlatter, 14 Mar 42, sub: Needs and
Requirements of Our Observation Squadrons and Support Units. Both in H. H.
Arnold Manuscript Collection, box 44, LOC.

34. Ltr, Maj Gen Jacob L. Devers, Cdr, HQ, Armored Forces, Fort Knox, Ky. t to
Arnold, 5 Sep 42, H. H. Arnold Manuscript Collection, box 44, LOC.

35. Ibid.; Memo, Spaatz, Cdr, HQ, AFCC, to Chief, AAF, 2 Mar 42, sub:
Organization of Air Support, file 321.9, CDF 1939-1942, RG 18, NARA;
Directive, P. M. Whitney, Asst Adjutant General, WD, to CG, HQ, AFCC, 21
Feb 42, sub: Organization of Air Support, file 321.9, CDF 1939-1942, RG 18,
NARA; Routing and Record Sheet, HQ, AAF, AFROM to AFACT, 4 Mar 42,
sub: Status of 5th Ground Support Command, file 321.9, CDF 1939-1942, RG
18, NARA; Routing and Record Sheet, HQ, AAF, AFDAS to AFRGS, Kuter
to Schlatter, 1 May 42, USAFHRC Microfilm Collection, 145.96-54, MAFB;
Ltr, Brig Gen John B. Brooks, Cdr, HQ, II Air Support Command, to Arnold
and Schlatter via Second Air Force, 20 Nov 42, file 373.21, CDF Oct 1942 to
May 1944, RG 18, NARA; Routing and Records Sheet, HQ, AAF, 11 Apr 42,
sub: Air-Ground Cooperative Training, with attached AFRGS (AAF Ground
Support Directorate) Rpt, 14 Apr 42, file 353 F, CDF 1939-1942, RG 18,
NARA; Memo, Gates, Director, Management Control, WD, to Director,
Military Requirements, WD, 14 Jul 42, sub: Transfer of Functional
Responsibility for Light and Dive Bombardment Aviation . . . , 14 Jul 42, file
452.1, CDF 1939-1942, RG 18, NARA.

36. Memo, Arnold to CofS, WD, 20 Jul 42, sub: Ground-Air Support of Armored
Forces, H. H. Arnold Manuscript Collection, box 42, LOC.

37. Memo, Arnold to SecWar, 23 Oct 42, sub: Aviation in Support of the Army
Ground Forces, H. H. Arnold Manuscript Collection, box 42, LOC.

38. Quoted words from War Department Basic Field Manual 31-35, Aviation in
Support of Ground Forces, 9 Apr 42. See also Greenfield et al., Organization
of Ground Troops , pp. 110-14.

39. Quoted words from War Department Basic Field Manual 31-35, Aviation in
Support of Ground Forces, 9 Apr 42. See also Schlatter to CGs, Second and
Third Air Forces, 3 Jun 42, sub: Reorganization of Observation Aviation, file
321.9, CDF 1939-1942, RG 18, NARA.

40. Greenfield et al., Organization of Ground Troops , p. 112.

41. War Department Field Manual 31-35, Aviation in Support of Ground Forces, 9
Apr 42; Greenfield et al., Organization of Ground Troops , pp. 110-14.

42. Quoted words from War Department Field Service Regulation, FM 100-15,
Larger Units, 29 Jun 42. See also Futrell, Ideas , p. 66.

43. Memo, Arnold to CofS, WD, 20 Jul 42, sub: Ground-Air Support of Armored
Forces; Memo, Arnold to SecWar, 23 Oct 42, sub: Aviation in Support of the
Army Ground Forces. Both in H. H. Arnold Manuscript Collection, box 42,
LOC.

44. Futrell, Ideas , pp. 49-51; Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The Framework
of Hemisphere Defense , United States Army in World War II (Washington,
D.C., Office of Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1960), pp 16-19; Final
Report of the Air Corps Board on Revision to the 5-year Experimental
Program , 23 Jun 39, in Lyons Records (large indexed microfilm collection),
Historians Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB); Ltr, Adjutant
General, WD, to Chief, Air Corps, 30 Oct 39, sub: Airplane Replacement and
Research and Development Programs, Lyons Records, WPAFB.

45. J. V. Mizrahi, Air Corps (Northridge, Calif.: Sentry Books, 1970), pp. 99-103;
Memo, Sherman Miles, Acting Asst CofS, G-2, WD, to Asst CofS, WPD, WD, 6
Jul 40, sub: Foreign Air Doctrine, Lyons Records, WPAFB; Memo, Brig Gen
George H. Brett, Chief, Material Division, WD, to Chief, Air Corps, 31 May
39, Lyons Records, WPAFB; Rpt, 10 May 39, sub: Board of Officers
Convened To Appraise Attack Bomber Designs . . . , file 452.1 "A" Attack
Bombers, Classified CDF 1939-1942, Entry 293, RG 18, NARA; Ltr, Arnold
to President, Air Corps Board, MAFB, 18 Aug 37, USAFHRC Microfilm
Collection, 145.93-117, MAFB; Ltr, Arnold to Asst SecWar, 10 Jan 39, sub:
Prototype Attack Bomber Airplane, Lyons Records, WPAFB; News Bulletin,
Leonard H. Engel, "Army To Select Prototype For New Class Of Plane in
Wright Field Competition; Attack Bomber Will Replace Attack Plane If
Successful," 24 Jan 39, file 452.1, CDF 1939-1942, RG 18, NARA; Memo to
Air Corps Board, sub: Study no. 35, USAFHRC Microfilm Collection, 248-22-
25, MAFB; Rpt, 3 Jul 42, sub: Use of Aircraft for Anti-tank Defense, file 381
B, CDF 1939-1942, RG 18, NARA.

46. Robert J. Waag, "Spy in the Sky," Air Power , January 1975, pp. 30-43;
Futrell, Command of Observation Aviation , pp. 1-11; Rick Giasebrook,
"Flying the North American 0-47 and the Curtiss-Wright 0-52," Aerospace
Historian , March 197S, pp. 5-11; Craven and Cate, Plans and Early
Operations , 1:618-21; Ltr, Arnold to Adjutant General, WD, 9 May 39, sub:
Military Characteristics of Aircraft, file 452.1 "A," Entry 293, Series II,
Classified CDF 1939-1942, RG 18, NARA; Proceedings of a Board of Officers
Appointed by the Following Orders, 16 May 39, approved by Arnold, headed
by Col Clarence L. Tinker, file 452.1 "B," Entry 293, Series II, Classified CDF
1939-1942, RG 18, NARA; Memo, Arnold to Tinker, 10 May 39 (Arnold
started the search for a slow speed liaison plane early in 1939), file 452. 1-H
Observation Planes, CDF 1939-1942, RG 18, NARA; Mai Holcomb, "Send
Grasshoppers!: How the U.S. Army Air Corps Procured a Fleet of
Liaison/Observation Aircraft Almost Overnight, in Spite of Itself," Wings ,
February 1983, pp. 40-49; Irving B. Holley, Jr., Evolution of the Liaison-type
Airplane, 1917-1944 (Washington, D.C.: AAF Historical Office, 1946).

47. Memo, Robert A. Lovett, Asst SecWar for Air, to Chief, AAF, 14 Aug 41, sub:
Procurement Service Quantity of Light Commercial Type Airplanes; Ltr, Lt
Gen 3. L. DeWitt, Cdr, Fourth Army, to Marshall, 5 Aug 41; Rpt, Col Robert
E. M. Goolrick, Cdr, Air Corps Troops, IX Army Corps, to CG, IX Army
Corps, Fort Lewis, Wash., 17 Mar 41, sub: Observation With the Corps. All in
USAFHRC Microfilm Collection, 248.2208B, MAFB.

48. Waag, "Spy in the Sky," pp. 30-43; Futrell, Command of Observation Aviation ,
pp. 1-11; Giasebrook, "Flying the North American 0-47 and the Curtiss-
Wright 0-52," pp. 5-11; Ltr, Arnold to Adjutant General, WD, 9 May 39, sub:
Military Characteristics of Aircraft, file 452.1 "A," Entry 293, Series II,
Classified CDF 1939-1942, RG 18, NARA; Proceedings of a Board of Officers
Appointed by the Following Orders, 16 May 39, approved by Arnold, headed
by Col Clarence L. Tinker, file 452.1 "B," Entry 293, Series II, Classified
CDF 1939-1942, RG 18, NARA; Memo, Arnold to Tinker, 10 May 39, file
452. i-H Observation Planes, CDF 1939-1942, RG 18, NARA; Holcomb, "Send
Grasshoppers!," pp. 40-49; Holley, Evolution of the Liaison-type Airplane,
1917-1944 ; Ltr, Kenney to Arnold, 25 Apr 42, and attached report, "Air
Support of Task Force Offensive Operations," file 385C, CDF 1939-1942, RG
18, NARA; Memo, Lynd, Air Support Section, AFCC, to CG, AFCC, 3 Feb 42,
sub: Summary of Items Discussed at Informal Conference, Group Captain
Willet, RAF . . . , file 385C, CDF 1939-1942, RG 18, NARA..

49. Memo, Arnold to Schlatter, 23 Dec 42, sub: Teamwork Between Air and
Ground Units, H. H. Arnold Manuscript Collection, box 42, LOC.

CHAPTER II

North African Close Air Support Operations

World War II Operations and North Africa

Intelligence sources did not anticipate the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
that brought the United States into war. Despite the buildup of forces and planning
for potential war during 1939 and 1940, the War Department was not as prepared as
it wanted to be. Still, the military flung what it had into battle with the Japanese
and began a buildup of forces in Europe and other parts of the world. Marshall
recognized that it would require months before a ground force could be raised big
enough for an invasion of the Continent. The British believed it would take years.
Army Air Forces leaders promised that their forces could start an offensive against
the Germans earlier than the ground forces, but it meant a slowdown in
development of air support forces. With presidential approval, in early 19*2, the
Eighth Air Force started preparations for a bombing campaign against Germany.

Then in mid-1942, pressured by the Russians and British to start a serious
land offensive, Roosevelt insisted that the military follow the British suggestion
and initiate a ground and air campaign in North Africa before the end of the year.
Field General Erwin Rommel's June offensive had created a crisis for the British in
the desert west of Cairo. In response, the Americans lined up some air units,
initiating the process with a detachment of B-2*s under Col. Harry A. Halverson.
By the fall of 19*2 the United States had sent a sizable American contingent of
aircraft to the British Western Desert Air Force, including some assigned to close
air support roles ( Map 1 ). By November American forces had formed into the Ninth
Air Force, commanded by Maj. Gen. L. H. Brereton.

American aviators gained experience with the unique British air-ground
cooperation system for the first time. The combined forces of General Sir Bernard
L. Montgomery's Eighth Army and the air units of Air Vice Marshal Sir Arthur
Coningham's Western Desert Air Force shared a great victory between August and
October 19*2 in the desert west of Cairo. Montgomery and Coningham mutually
decided that ground and aviation command components functioned best as equal
partners at the army level. Air and ground field staffs also had the same
headquarters and living quarters. It was a true joint command, as neither

MAP 1

Montgomery nor Coningham demanded final authority. It helped that the
techniques involved in joint command were amenable to offensive, as opposed to
defensive, operations. Success in pushing Rommel to the west helped make the
adventure a positive one in the minds of many observers and participants. By
August Brereton had grasped the significance of Coningham's employment of air
support fighters and bombers. He reported to Arnold on the importance of the
command arrangement in the Western Desert, and how the cooperation came from
a natural sympathy and understanding between air and ground commander,'

At the same time, as staff and forces were gathering in England for
Operation TORCH, Allied strategists were contending with multiplying demands
for resources from other theaters. Increasing requirements for worldwide
operations reduced air resources for close air support. The fight against Rommel
to clear the Mediterranean received special attention, if not a higher priority than
TORCH, in the late summer of 19^2. The desire to relieve pressure against the
Soviet Union grew in importance as the victorious German summer campaign
brought the Axis into the Caucasus and closer to the Middle East. The Allies
juggled resources to expand the commitment to the Middle East. Thus, large
quantities of fighters and light and medium bombers, used in close support work,
were diverted from TORCH to the Western Desert, the Middle East, and Russia. In
one case, General Dwight David Eisenhower, supreme commander of TORCH,
interceded to prevent the 33d Fighter Group from being sent to the Western
Desert. ^

On 2 October President Roosevelt directed Secretary of War Henry L.
Stimson to increase the flow of aircraft to Russia. Marshall was concerned, and
after conferences with Arnold and presidential adviser Harry Hopkins, he went
directly to the president. He told Roosevelt that the only way to increase the
monthly lend-lease airplane schedule to the Soviet Union would be "a reduction of
planes urgently needed for our units in combat theaters, or to curtail seriously the
plans for TORCH. Roosevelt wanted TORCH to be a success, but he kept pressure
on Marshall to support all theaters. For example, on 2* October Roosevelt
ordered his military chiefs to make sure the South Pacific as well as North Africa
operations were supported with "munitions and planes and crews. . . ." In order "to
take advantage of our success, "he judged, "we must have adequate air support in

both places. . . ." In England, planning for the invasion of North Africa, Eisenhower
wanted as much air power as possible. He was not entirely clear about the
published doctrine on close air support, and he was uncertain about understanding
among his lieutenants. He would give close air support special attention. After all
this was the first major land campaign for the United States, and the eyes of the
Americans and Allies were looking for results. 3

Planning Close Air Support for North Africa

In October 19f2, just weeks before the landing in North Africa, Eisenhower's
Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) planners issued an operations memorandum on
the subject of close air support. In this directive, "Combat Aviation in Direct
Support* of Ground Units," the planners attempted to clarify command and control
authority and to prescribe methods of coordinating the air units in direct support of
ground forces. They noted that American and British doctrine agreed, pointing out
that the basic American FM 31-35 matched British Army Training Instruction No.
6 and that the communications systems of the American and the British— air
support control centers and liaison parties for lower-echelon units—were quite
similar. Eisenhower's planners paid particular attention to the sensitive problem of
response time, suggesting that most lost time was caused by the ground
commanders who could not make up their minds. They recommended that
identified targets should be forwarded ahead of time to the command center so
that missions could be organized. When this was not possible, they would allow "a
suitable portion of supporting combat aviation ... be maintained on 'alert' status,
either 'ground' or 'air.'" Their directive did not define a "suitable portion" of
aircraft for alert status. Airmen seemed unaware of the potential for abuse of
limited air resources. In any regard, the wishes of the ground commander
dominated this portion of the directive.'*

Allied planners now placed much responsibility for the air-ground system on
the ground commander: "Effective air support of ground troops is dependent on a
proper estimate of the situation by the supported commander." But they still

* Direct air support was the British term for close air support. Its use here
illustrates the British influence on Allied thought processes and publications.

waffled on the level of command authority over air support. Although all air
forces would "operate under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Allied
Forces," the Allied commander could allot forces to a task force commander. The
task force commander would normally retain control, but he could also "designate
part of his combat aviation to assist directly a specified unit of the Task Force."
A clear potential existed for air support units being controlled by brigade or
division commanders as well as corps or army commanders. The remarkable aspect
of this Allied directive was that it ran against the trend of equality between air
and ground forces being established by a successful Allied force operating in the
Western Desert. 5

The planners also included in their memorandum some long-running concerns
of airmen: "As a general rule, only those targets which cannot be reached quickly
and effectively by artillery should be assigned to combat aviation." Command was
generally centralized, either under the commander-in-chief, Allied Forces, or
under a task force commander. Probable targets would be discovered and reported
by observation aircraft that, lacking radios, would report on their return to base.
Most air support operations would then be planned ahead of time and often by the
highest command authority rather than the battalion, regiment, or division in the
field. The final line of the directive, before Brig. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith's
signature block, warned about the vulnerability and scarcity of air forces:
"Available direct support aviation must neither be dispersed nor frittered away on
unimportant targets. The mass of such support should be reserved for
concentration and overwhelming attack upon important objectives." 6

Because most of the force for TORCH would be American, it was appropriate
that British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Roosevelt picked Eisenhower for
the post of commander-in-chief, directing a small AFHQ staff. Eisenhower's task
force was organized largely by national components. The desired integration of
this force had to be carried out by Eisenhower's personal effort rather than through
a combined organization. Ground forces were originally organized into American
and British task forces, supported by the Allied Naval Expeditionary Force and the
American Twelfth Air Force and British Eastern Air Command. 7

To gather enough resources for the Twelfth Air Force, Arnold stripped the
England-based Eighth Air Force of fighter, light bomber, and even some heavy
bomber squadrons. These and additional units fresh from training in the United

States, and with most personnel only partially trained, were formed into three
functional Twelfth Air Force components: XII Bomber Command, XII Fighter
Command, and XII Air Support Command. On 23 October Maj. Gen. James H.
Doolittle, just back from the raid on Japan, assumed command of these units as
chief of the new Twelfth Air Force and as chief airman on Eisenhower's staff. &

While all three components of the Twelfth Air Force would support
Eisenhower's theater mission, the XII Air Support Command had a first priority to
support the Fifth Army. It would provide close air support functions of close-in
bombing and strafing of enemy ground forces, air defense against enemy aircraft,
and observation. It would also undertake missions not connected to the immediate
needs of the ground forces, such as attacking enemy air facilities, long-range
reconnaissance, and bombing and strafing deep in the enemy rear. Eisenhower
agreed that the Twelfth Air Force should employ "both tactical and strategic
elements" in common with the British air forces practices. By "strategic elements"
he meant bombing units that could destroy distant military targets, such as air
bases, shipping, ports, and communications centers.* The XII Fighter and XII
Bomber Commands, indeed all Allied air resources, would be available to support
TORCH ground forces as determined by the commander-in-chief, Eisenhower
came to his command with a long-time interest in aviation support for the ground
forces. While he wanted support for the ground forces, he also supported the
strategic bombing campaign, directed by Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz in England, because
it would soften up Germany and thus facilitate success in future battles. Given his
responsibilities for theater and large strategic concerns, Eisenhower was inclined
to see the unity-of-command concept from the theater point of view. Consistent
with Army doctrine, the theater commander controlled all resources. In turn,
Eisenhower had a tendency to think of aviation, if not close air support
specifically, in terms of theater rather than of army, corps, or division interests.
He was more inclined, therefore, to allow the Army Air Forces to centralize air
resources and have command at a higher level.^

Anticipating the needs of future war, Arnold and other staff airmen in
Washington had developed similar concepts for command on a modern battlefield.

*Today "strategic elements" would be regarded as deep battlefield interdiction.

They had accepted the necessity for command decisions being made at a theater or
task force level of command, but they gave this unity-of-command concept another
twist when talking about joint air-ground operations. Arnold advocated the
"principle of command," where the air commander would have "direct command of
the tactical operations" of the air forces in air operations. During July 19^2 he
articulated the concept of "direct command" in a memo to Maj. Gen. Thomas T.
Handy, the assistant chief of staff for operations. Arnold argued that the air
commander was the specialist and that he should have control over his particular
operations. He cited Maj. Gen. M. F. Harmon: "The Air Force Commanders are
especially trained to appreciate the peculiar powers and limitations of the Air
Arm, and are therefore particularly suited to exercise tactical command in order
to realize the maximum performance of the units involved." It is not clear how
much of Arnold's concept meshed with the idea of a task force concept of
Eisenhower, but Eisenhower came to accept great independence among his
commanders. He saw his air, ground, and naval chiefs having a dual role. First,
everyone worked with Eisenhower's staff in the development of plans; then each
became the responsible commander for executing his part of the whole
operation. 10

As the vagaries of war would have it, the Combined Chiefs of Staff did not
establish a clear directive for Eisenhower until the last few weeks before the
invasion was to take place. Eisenhower would make a three-pronged invasion of
North Africa. That meant the American ground forces and supporting air forces
would have to be split into three elements: one for an invasion at Oran, Algeria;
another to land in French Morocco; and another, a combined British-American
force under British Lt. Gen. K. A. N. Anderson, to invade at Algiers (Map 2 ). The
role of the air forces in support of the ground forces was confused when the
functional organization of an air force (into bombardment, fighter, and air support
commands) was altered, with the air commands split up in their assignment to
different ground invasion commands. Time was incredibly brief for gathering
sufficient air support forces and for organizing them in an effective manner.

TORCH planners gave the task force commanders clear operational control
of their supporting air resources. Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., sailing directly
from the United States, would command the Western Task Force landing in French

Landing site

300 MILES

300 KILOMETERS

MAP 2

Morocco. His command included Brig. Gen. John K. Cannon's XII Air Support
Command, which also had been recently formed in the United States. Maj. Gen.
Lloyd Fredendall would command the Central Task Force landing in Oran. He
controlled portions of the XII Fighter and XII Bomber Commands led by Col.
Lauds Norstad, Doolittle's operations officer. The multiple air services for ground
support, as exemplified in an air support command, were missing in the latter case,
an indication of indifference or fuzzy thinking about the kind of aircraft to be used
in close air support work in North Africa. 11

Even with the last-minute changes, TORCH planners insisted on following the
dictates of British-United States air doctrine. For example, after the Oran and
Casablanca ground forces won their battles and reconsolidated into the Fifth Army,
the XII Air Support Command would continue to provide the single point of air
support service. In addition, the bomber and fighter commands would be on call for
close air support and other ground tasks; but, when not on alert, they would turn to
the "normal" (planned interdiction) Air Force objectives. In a report to Patton,
Doolittle agreed that ground warfare was the main focus of the theater operations.
He also wanted it clarified that first priority went to air superiority and that
supporting ground action came second. 12

As envisioned by Eisenhower's planners, the Twelfth Air Force would provide
communications equipment and personnel necessary to the command and control*
of air units. Twelfth Air Force air support parties attached to infantry divisions
and armored columns would relay air support requests to an air support control
center, set up next to the task force command post. After the task force
commander approved requests for air support from the subordinate units, they
would be transmitted to the Twelfth Air Force. Air Force expertise would play its
part at the Twelfth Air Force or the XII Air Support Command. The XII Air
Support Command would then allocate missions to the appropriate subordinate
fighter, bomber, or observation unit. 13

The one British and two American forces were both casually and awkwardly

*Neither "command and control" nor "C 2 " were terms commonly employed in
World War II. Terms like "communications" or "air support control" would be the
most comparable terminology.

integrated. Problems resulted. The command chain, from task force commanders
upwards to Eisenhower and his small AFHQ staff, was clear enough. So too was the
command downward, from task force commander to supporting air forces.
Connections in other directions, often necessary and useful in a combined
operation, were weak. For example, in terms of aviation, Air Marshal Sir William
Welsh of the Eastern Air Command, supporting the British First Army, had but very
oblique coordination responsibilities for the Royal Air Force Middle East, Malta
forces, and British naval aviation. As another example, the two air commanders,
Welsh with the Eastern Air Command, and Doolittle with the Western Air
Command that supported the American task forces, were not connected. They
made their plans in isolation from one another. Planning for aviation was flawed
by the separate tasking and areas of responsibilities for the ground and air support
forces for the invasion. An important question asked by the planners was whether
the flaws would jeopardize the invasion itself or whether they would be
unimportant until forces had time to reorganize once solidly ashore. 1 *

Operations: TORCH Landings and the Offensive Against Tunisia

Casualties were light during the TORCH landings, 8 November 1942, at
Casablanca and at Oran and Algiers. The inexperience of the forces was very
evident. Even the British forces had not absorbed lessons from the successful
Eighth Army operations in Libya. Fortunately, the Vichy French, having no heart
for serious battle, undertook only a short-lived delaying action. The XII Air
Support Command with Patton in the Western Task Force could not get Army Air
Forces aircraft off the carriers that were carrying them to the invasion shore and
into action until after the surrender at Casablanca. Naval aircraft picked up the
responsibility, carrying out the necessary air cooperation tasks. Only air support
parties and service personnel of the XII Air Support Command became involved in
the action by participating in a II Corps infantry assault. The 31st Fighter Group
flew to Oran to help the naval air forces support Fredendall and his ground forces
in a brief battle for Oran, but the French surrendered that city on D-Day plus 2.
The Royal Air Force helped, in a minor fashion, the Eastern Assault Force, led by
Maj. Gen. Charles W. Ryder. A successful assault on Algiers, in order to facilitate
seizure of Tunisia, was the most important object of Operation TORCH. Algiers

surrendered on the evening of D-Day.!5

As the troops were congratulating themselves, General Anderson arrived in
Algiers to start the push eastward. The British First Army and, for close air
support, the Royal Air Forces' No. 2^2 Group, Eastern Air Command, made up the
main force. Attached to Anderson's task force were a few Free French and
American elements. The largest American unit was a tank regiment of Combat
Command B, commanded by Col. Paul M. Robinett. Supporting American air
elements, including the 60th Troop Carrier Group (C-47s), l^th Fighter Group (P-
38s), and 15th Bombardment Squadron (A-20s), were employed by the Eastern Air
Command within a few weeks. Six hundred miles to the east, in Tunisia, the
Germans were assembling a large counterforce. Time became important, with
winter rains expected in December and Rommel in full retreat before Montgomery,
westward toward Tunisia. *6

As with the TORCH landings, the Allies underestimated the opposition and
problems associated with a winter campaign hundreds of miles across Algeria and
Tunisia. Their planners had assumed that the Vichy French and local Arabs would
not effectively deter the rush eastward and that the Axis would not build a strong
defense. Air and ground leaders did not make a great effort to absorb the lessons
of mobile warfare, including the revival of the principle of mass dictated by
Montgomery's Eighth Army experience. Anderson led the forces with the British
First Army, which was composed of one incomplete division and a few smaller
units, including a small portion of the American 1st Armored Division. British
tactical air forces and portions of the Twelfth Air Force provided close air support.
Troops were well trained, but the force included neither experienced, battle-
tested, leaders nor individual units. Anderson spread his attacking force in a
north-to-south formation in the drive eastward towards Tunisia. His intent was to
prevent Axis units from harassing the main drive along the coast, but the spread
formation precluded concentration of forces to push through Axis defenses just
then building up in Tunisia (Map 3 ). Allied intelligence initially underestimated
Axis strength in numbers of aircraft, vehicles, and defensive weapons. Then, by
the end of November, as additional Allied units were called in to beef up the attack
against determined Axis air and ground forces, the logistical support broke down,
and the forces at the front could not be adequately supplied.

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

MAP 3

A host of problems affecting general operations likewise limited the air-
ground support system. Long distances and inadequate transportation facilities
limited logistics support for the air forces as well as the army. A lack of all-
weather airfields forced units to crowd onto workable fields, and the long distances
to targets limited the time Allied support aircraft could loiter over the battlefield
waiting for calls from the ground (Map » ). Lack of radar and inadequate
communications systems encouraged Anderson to look for alternatives in his air
support. He ignored standard doctrine, for example, when he resorted to extensive
employment of aircraft in defensive cover missions to try to stop the aggressive
German air attacks. This left insufficient aircraft for other close air support tasks
and other tactical functions, such as air superiority, supply interdiction, and
reconnaissance.

In mid-November, when Anderson moved his headquarters eastward towards
the Algerian-Tunisian border, he asked the Royal Air Force to carefully coordinate
with his ground forces the obviously inadequate number of aircraft. Air
Commodore G. M. Lawson moved into a command post next door to facilitate air-
ground support. Evidence suggests that the interrelationship was not effective;
Lawson was not able to control the few American units transferred to the British-
led task force, raising the charge that air and ground leaders were conducting
separate warfare. For their part, airmen claimed that many mission requests
produced ineffective results and that aircraft were wasted on missions to satisfy
demands of subordinate ground commanders. The record shows extensive air
activity during the third week of November, when fighters flew nearly fifteen
hundred reconnaissance and top-cover defense sorties. Unfortunately, it is never
clear how many of these were conducted as close air support missions, as opposed
to general air support work. Eisenhower was becoming convinced that one way to
attack the problem of air support was to bring air units under the more centralized
control of an air commander.

During the last week in November, when Anderson attacked with his force's
greatest energy, the air arms flew nineteen hundred sorties, twice the number of
the Axis. Close air support in terms of defensive covers continued, but most air
missions were given to bombing the supply line and hitting shipping and air bases.
The intensive air action produced heavy aircraft losses and damage that could not

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

MAP 4

be overcome by shorthanded maintenance crews or replacement aircraft and crews.
The greatest problem, according to the ground commanders, was the repeated
attack by the supposedly obsolete German Stukas. Fighters would be called up for
defensive cover, but because of the great distances, the fighter loitering time was
brief. While the Allied aircraft were in the air, German dive bombers merely
returned to their airfields and waited for the all-clear signal. Allied air forces
could not provide enough continuity in their air cover. I*

Because Allied air support forces could not stem the enemy air attacks over
the battlefield, some ground commanders complained. Robinett, now a brigadier
general, insisted "that men cannot stand the mental and physical strain of constant
aerial bombing without feeling that all possible is being done to beat enemy air
efforts." Brig. Gen. Terry Allen, commander of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division
during the invasion of Oran, suggested that division command staffs should include
an air adviser. Allen had been assigned a temporary air adviser, Col. Harold
Fowler, during the landing assault, to help plan air support for the ground forces.
Allen saw great weakness in the "on call" air support by which requests went up
through the various levels of army command and down through the air force
echelons. The method was too slow. He wanted a system that assured "prompt air
support against anticipated targets in the zone of advance of the major effort."^

Eisenhower agreed that enemy "strafing and dive-bombing" were responsible
for stopping the attempted advances of the First Army. Anderson suggested that
unless the enemy attacks could be reduced, Allied forces would have to withdraw
to a position where they could get cover. The ground commanders were even more
adamant about cover because they did not see or know of reciprocal air attacks
against enemy troops. Eisenhower and Anderson were probably unaware that
Churchill, in reference to use of the air umbrella in the Western Desert the year
previous, had forbidden the use of aircraft in troop-cover operations because it was
a waste of resources. The air doctrine of both Allied forces also rejected
employment of air cover as an inefficient use of air resources. Nevertheless, the
orders of insistent ground commanders carried weight, and airmen continued
assigning ineffective air cover missions. When the battle got worse for the Allies,
airmen pointed to improper employment of air cover as an important cause for
failure. But the air forces failed in other areas of air support. Fighter groups

continued their offensive air missions against enemy air bases and air defense over
friendly forces, but were not trained for strafing. Light bombers, originally
designed for close air support work, proved useless against well-protected targets
and were assigned night bombardment duties, which minimized enemy defensive
fire from aircraft or ground antiaircraft artillery. The Allies had no effective
ground attack aircraft until mid-December, when they brought in some modified P-
40s and Hurricanes that would serve as fighter-bombers. 19

Believing that victory in Tunisia depended on full employment of air power,
and the fact that the ground forces were unable to break Axis defense, Eisenhower
halted the offensive. Winter rains and mud made the operations difficult
throughout December. Ground forces, with supporting air units, probed at
weaknesses in the German lines, but the offense was uncoordinated and
opportunistic. Until mid-January, Allied operations aimed at local consolidation
and keeping pressure on the enemy. The air forces started work on new airfields
closer to the battlefield. Eastern Air Command and Twelfth Air Force bombers
continued the interdiction attacks on ports, supply dumps, shipping, and airfields in
Tunisia and Sicily, but generally the enemy retained air superiority in the region. 20

Operations: Reorganization and the Second Tunisian Offensive

While many Twelfth Air Force units had been released to aid the First Army
in November and December of 1942, Allied leaders held back a number of units in
western Algeria and Morocco, and assigned them to protect the lines of
communications with Gibraltar and England. The usefulness of these units for
operations against the Axis was limited, because personnel and units lacked
operational training and because poor transportation facilities prevented supply and
maintenance of additional troops on the battlefront. In view of his dual mission to
protect the lines of communications in Morocco and Algeria and to support
Anderson's drive against Tunisia in November, Doolittle began organizing the air
forces into flexible composite commands, each with a specific geographic area of
responsibility.

By the end of December Eisenhower, more satisfied with the pacification of
Morocco and Algeria and willing to increase force strength for the campaign in

Tunisia, invalidated the need for Doolittle's small composite air forces. Rather,
Eisenhower agreed with ground and air commanders that the time was ripe for a
centralized air command in the Mediterranean, to coordinate the air forces better.
On 5 January 1943, with British concurrence, he instituted a new layer in the air
command structure, designating a new air force headquarters, the Allied Air
Forces, at his headquarters in Algiers. He appointed his air adviser, General
Spaatz, commander of this Allied Air Force. Spaatz had great influence organizing
the British and American air effort in Tunisia, but he had difficulty coordinating
the widely separated air units because communications was crude and inadequately
supplied. AFHQ, the headquarters of British and American armies, the Navy, and
even the Allied Air Force were in different locations in Algeria and Morocco.
Sometimes motorcycles were the only available means for transmitting messages
and command instructions.

Eisenhower also accepted the British concept of dividing major mission
responsibilities by function rather than by national consideration. Nevertheless, a
tendency of maintaining national unity in lower echelons prevailed throughout the
war. The reorganization again left close air support functions without central
direction on the battlefield. In the new Allied air force structure Doolittle's
bomber organization would specialize in deep-strike bombing missions, and the
Royal Air Force would specialize in air-ground support. Eisenhower assigned Air
Commodore Lawson the task of close air support for British First Army. When
American forces began to be deployed, Eisenhower could not resist letting the
American airmen support American ground forces, and the Twelfth Air Force
carried out support to the American ground forces in Tunisia, as well as its
bombing missions. 21

In January 1943 Eisenhower decided to intensify efforts in central Tunisia;
favorable weather conditions promised better results along the coast, where mud
and strong defensive positions slowed Anderson's First Army (Map 5) . Eisenhower
designated Fredendall's II Corps as the principal ground force for the advance
against the German communications line that ran north to south through Tunisia.
Important to later events, a new Free French element was slipped in between the
American and British forces operating in the north. Remaining at Algiers,
Eisenhower assumed direct command of military operations on the entire front,

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American Battlefield
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40 MILES

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Ben Gardane

exercising that command through a ground deputy, Brig. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott,
Jr., stationed at Constantine, a hundred or so miles from the front. Spaatz, as
Eisenhower's staff air officer, and the Twelfth Air Force played an integral part in
AFHQ planning. Spaatz directed air force operations of continuing interest to the
theater, including close air support; interdiction against Axis forces, shipping,
ports, and airfields; reconnaissance service; and air defense. Spaatz also surveyed
the battlefield with Maj. Gen. Mark W. Clark in an attempt to develop better
cooperation between air and ground units. 22

Eisenhower moved the XII Air Support Command from Morocco and,
following previous procedures, attached it to II Corps. Spaatz sought to tie the air
and ground forces together by appointing a XII Air Support colonel to serve as
liaison officer with the British First Army and by dedicating airplanes to both of
the major ground commanders, Anderson and Fredendall. Brig. Gen. Howard A.
Craig, who replaced Cannon as the commander of the XII Air Support Command,
outlined a conventional air support plan: He would locate his headquarters next to
II Corps Headquarters; his fighter and light bomber groups would serve as the basic
force, but other Twelfth Air Force units could be called in as necessary; an
advanced operations command post would help control air units in the advanced
combat area; and air support parties with HF and VHF radio sets would be
attached to combat commands or teams. 23

Craig's plans indicated that close air support missions would be a large part
of the XII Air Support Command's efforts but that other tactical missions were
important as well, and ground commanders would have to appreciate certain air
limitations. He stipulated that air missions be planned in advance and that
extemporaneous calls for air support be kept to a minimum. Prior to D-Day, all
available air units would reconnoiter the front and flanks of the advance route.
Fighter sweeps would hit enemy air installations and, joining with light bombers,
they would attack any enemy counteroffense. Close air support air cover for the
advancing forces would be "provided only at critical places and for limited
periods." For full daylight cover, other Twelfth Air Force fighter aircraft would
have to be called into the campaign. Orders for missions would come from the Air
Support Command. Craig asserted that the Air Support Command would exert a
maximum effort against previously identified enemy targets, but that a large

portion of the air strength would be held "in readiness for calls from the Air
Support Parties with the several elements of the Division and Corps." 2 *

On 17 January II Corps was just beginning a forward movement in central
Tunisia when it was preempted by a German counterattack at a weak spot in the
line— the French defenders located between the Americans in the south and British
forces in northern Tunisia. The British 6th Armoured Division as well as Robinett's
armor moved to the aid of the retreating French. The action was over quickly. By
the twenty-fifth the German advance was halted. The Royal Air Force's tactical
air organization, No. 242 Group, put up daily fighter-bomber sorties, but the XII
Air Support Command gave only minor aid during the eight days of defensive
action. Post-battle evaluation suggested several reasons for lack of aid from the
XII Air Support Command, including an inhibiting enemy air superiority, inadequate
command and control of available close air resources, and ineffective tactics. 2 ^ In
an interview Maj. Gen. Lunsford E. Oliver, who had been Combat Command B
commander earlier, suggested that, with enemy air superiority, ground forces
needed a quicker response time when they requested air support. The system of
requests going up and down command echelons was too slow. Instead, "We've got to
be able to call for our support planes that are actually in the air." 2 * 1

The first intense encounters with German forces revealed a flaw in American
support bombardment tactics. Their use of light and medium bombers for low-level
close air support missions proved disastrous because of effective German light
antiaircraft artillery. Arnold's fears about the new bombers were justified. The A-
20, B-25, and B-26 crews were forced to high altitude operations while in the
middle of combat operations. While flying at a new altitude of 10,000 feet was not
difficult, trying to hit targets using crude bomb sights and flying in formation
proved impossible without intense training. The airmen had some succcess
experimenting with the British fighter-bomber technique using bomb-carrying
fighters to attack front-line targets. Fighter resources were overstrained,
however, trying to provide escort for bombers and area defense for airfields and
for the ground operations attacked by offensive-minded Axis air forces.

There was blame for all. Although poor training and inadequate numbers of
aircraft were at the heart of the complaints from the II Corps, airmen also found
fault with II Corps' ignorance of Army air doctrine. For example, the II Corps

commander, Fredendall, refused a request for air reconnaissance from the French,
suggesting that the French sector was not his responsibility. In another instance
Spaatz felt it was necessary to come to Fredendall's headquarters to complain
about the improper use of reconnaissance aircraft. Contrary to Spaatz's orders,
Fredendall had ordered light bomber missions over enemy territory, when the
bombers were equipped with sensitive gear that would jeopardize Allied security if
captured. Spaatz insisted that Fredendall should not attempt to operate the air
resources without a knowledgeable airman by his side and that the XII Air Support
Command commander, Craig, should control the air resources until air and ground
headquarters could be joined. Eisenhower recognized the difficulty of coordinating
forces across national lines, and taking a cue from Allied leaders at Casablanca, on
21 January he assigned Anderson coordinating responsibilities for all Allied
forces. 27

At the same time, Eisenhower ordered his staff air operations officer, Brig.
Gen. Laurence S. Kuter, to command all Allied air support operations. Within a
few days, Eisenhower recognized the difficulty for Anderson to coordinate
independent commands spread over a broad front. On 26 January Anderson was
given command over the Allied forces in the Tunisian offensive. Kuter was now
directly responsible to Anderson, and he located his headquarters with Anderson's
at Constantine. Kuter's Allied Air Support Command coordinated missions for the
XII Air Support Command and the No. 2*2 Group and passed bombing requests to
Twelfth Air Force and Eastern Air Command. Always concerned with theater
strategy, Eisenhower informed Anderson that the Allied air forces would continue
to attack Rommel's communications lines. The command arrangement developed
by Eisenhower began to resemble even more the air forces doctrinal model for
centralized theater control of air. 2 *

On 30 January the Germans launched their second of three major offensives
against the Allies in Tunisia, this one also against the French sector. Eisenhower
attached II Corps under the command of the British First Army, although Anderson
in turn directed Fredendall to command all ground forces in the area of attack.
Anderson and Fredendall did not have a system to coordinate the air support,
except through the efforts of Kuter at Allied Air Support Command. Close air
support promised to be a problem, and the likelihood of a problem was increased by

the appointment of a new commander for the XII Air Support Command. Col. Paul
L. Williams had a reputation of being compliant to ground commanders. He also
carried less rank and influence than Craig.

For five days Allied forces fought a defensive battle, finally retreating to
stronger positions. Again, Allied air could not gain superiority over Axis air and
was still too weak to play a decisive role against the Axis ground advance. With
assistance from Rommel's German Desert Air Force and the Italian air forces,
which had been forced back by the British in the east, the Axis kept effective
control of the air over Tunisia. In the middle of the battle German Stukas laid a
vicious attack on the 1st Armored Division's Combat Command D.* Ground
commanders again asked for more air cover. Williams directed some strafing and
bombing attacks against German assault forces in direct support of Allied ground
operations. He allocated aircraft for interdiction strikes, especially at
communications in the German rear. He also coordinated with Kuter's Allied Air
Support Command the employment of other air organizations, including some
interdiction missions by the Twelfth Air Force fighters and bombers, even the B-
17s normally used for more distant targets, against the German rear.

Williams also complied with the ground commander's requests for a defensive
air umbrella, and on one occasion, on 1 February, his fighter cap caught and broke
up attacking Stuka and Messerschmitt Me-109 fighter escort formations. However,
the intense activity in close air support and other tactical missions extracted a
price from XII Air Support Command resources. Flying organizations were
debilitated. For example, the most experienced fighter unit, the 33d Fighter
Group, suffered so many losses it was forced into retirement in Morocco for
regrouping. Air and ground leaders learned about the attrition of air resources in
air-ground missions, namely, that aircraft were easily used up and as vulnerable as
air doctrine suggested. Leaders also recognized that defensive air operations,
especially covers flown on a broad-fronted war, used up all available resources.
Either more aircraft were needed to respond to the requests of the ground
commanders or Williams would have to allocate his aircraft more judiciously. 29

*The 1st Armored Division was organized into four subunits to facilitate separate
taskings: Combat Commands A, B, C, and D.

Eisenhower felt that the Army's failure stemmed from the confusion of battle
and inexperience of the troops, who were unable to maintain their composure in
combat. He told Fredendall, Anderson, Spaatz, and other subordinate commanders
that battle losses were caused "by failure of officers to carry out orders, by men
failing to construct foxholes or slit trenches, by disregard of orders requiring use of
vehicle blackout lights, by running vehicle columns closed up." He believed the
troops had insufficient antiaircraft defenses, and he suggested that additional
training was needed to teach ground troops not only that enemy dive bombers were
vulnerable to small arms fire but also that they should "fire with every available
weapon against enemy aircraft within range." 30 Eisenhower turned to the
experienced Mideast British commanders for guidance.

Eisenhower did not criticize the published air-ground doctrine; rather, he
indicated that the problem with close air support operations lay in the need for air

of existing doctrine. At the air support command level Williams also approved the
basic doctrine in FM 31-35. Both men suggested that the combat practices were
distorting some of the doctrine, especially the defensive stance necessary for air
cover. Airmen had consistently asserted, and published doctrine stated, that air
umbrellas overtaxed the limited resources and were, by their very nature,
incomplete and ineffective. In addition, if the air support commander allocated his
resources for a widespread defensive cover, he would be unable to concentrate his
forces for the air superiority campaign. The only way to stop the enemy air
attack, according to current Army Air Force doctrine, was to give it the highest
priority and destroy aircraft in offensive air actions and attacks on enemy air
bases. At Eisenhower's headquarters Kuter asserted that the German dive bomber
attack on Combat Command D marked the only time American troops suffered
greatly under destructive German air attack, even though Stukas attacked on
several occasions. In summary, air and ground leaders at theater level agreed that
the air and ground forces put great effort into close air support but failed to apply
published doctrine. It would take more education and training to change the ground
commanders' minds on the danger of Stukas before they would decrease their
demands for increased air support. Close air support practices and doctrine were
not yet in accord on the battlefield. 32

Operations: Kasserine and a New Look at Close Air Support

In mid-February 19^3 the Axis attacked in central Tunisia again.33 This
time Rommel, who had been retreating westward across Tripolitania, running from
Montgomery and the British Eighth Army, gathered enough forces to hit the center
of the Allied line in Tunisia. The forewarned II Corps forces were just then
preparing a defense. Rommel attempted to split Eisenhower's Allied forces in
Western Tunisia while protecting his flank from Montgomery's forces.

took heavy losses, even though commanders concentrated the bulk of the Allied air
support resources and ground forces in the central region. Troops could not protect
airfields and artillery brigades, which were overrun. Tanks, half-tracks, and mobile

artillery were captured and destroyed by the hundreds. Strengthened with British
armor, Fredendall tried to maintain a defense in Kasserine Pass on 18 February,
but German units overcame Allied defenders and poured through the pass on the
nineteenth.

The XII Air Support Command ordered missions, but the effort was
diminished because the forward bases were lost and aircraft were forced to fly
greater distances for fuel and munitions. The Allied Air Support Command in
Constantine reinforced the defense by calling in additional Twelfth Air Force
resources, including medium and heavy bombers, fighters, and transports. Light
bomber and fighter units tried to furnish defensive cover over retreating Allied
troops. Success was mixed with failure. On one occasion fighter-bombers had
appreciable effect bombing and strafing enemy infantry, guns, and tanks. On
another occasion friendly ground fire was deadly to the air forces— on 21 and 22
February, Combat Command B antiaircraft fire turned back American flights,
destroying five planes and damaging other friendly ground attack aircraft.

On the twenty-second British Tommies and Churchill tanks stopped a German
Panzer unit near the border of Tunisia and Algeria, an event which seemed to take
the spirit out of Rommel's offensive. On the twenty-third, with great effort, the
Allies counterattacked and pushed the Germans back through the pass. Hoping to
conserve his tanks for the continuing fight against the British Eighth Army,
Rommel pulled his forces into defensive positions in the next range of mountains to

French and British forces, as well as II Corps units in the region,

the east. The battle around the Kasserine turned out to be the last serious Axis
offensive effort in Africa,

The Allied debacle at Kasserine exposed some structural as well as
technological failings and underestimations about necessary force strength to
battle the Axis powers. Allied forces in Tunisia were not as experienced in mobile
warfare as the Axis or Allied forces in the Western Desert. Both air and ground
force leaders assessed air support as ineffective. As usual, the ground forces
commanders got less air support than they wanted. Some crippling problems,
common to battle, limited the effectiveness of air operations. Like many ground
units, air squadrons had been overrun by Rommel's attack. Forward bases, fuel,
bombs, and supplies had to be abandoned or destroyed. Disrupted communications
caused by the retreating defense hampered interaction. A more dramatic
limitation resulted from bad flying weather from 18 to 21 February. Even heavy
bombers, called in for the occasion, could not find targets through the overcast.
Not until the twenty-second, during the repulse, could the Allied air forces help
significantly. The Allies were not alone in blaming the weather for their
performances. Rommel attested to the bad weather. He blamed his failed offense
on weather that grounded the Luftwaffe .

Complaints and commentary about air support came from every direction.
The attack by enemy aircraft was intense enough to cause many ground troops to
shoot at any plane in sight. Pilots complained about fire from friendly forces, and
the situation was desperate enough to cause Combat Command B Commander
Robinett to order that his troops not fire on any aircraft until after an attacker
showed national colors. Doolittle suggested, unsuccessfully, that the Allies should
stop ground operations and undertake an intensive air campaign to destroy the
enemy air forces before continuing the Tunisian campaign. Even Churchill
complained about the air support operations, blasting the failure of the Allied
forces to build up satisfactory air superiority when so many first-line aircraft and
large numbers of support personnel had been committed to aviation in Tunisia. The
prime minister also suggested that the apparent inadequacy of allocated resources
pointed to the need for an even greater allotment of war materials for Tunisia.
Americans had been expected to provide the quantity necessary to win the war, and
military leaders could be rightfully embarrassed when these battles in Tunisia

pointed to a failure of their arms- The airmen began to realize that a tough enemy
required even more resources than originally conceived and that greater intensity
and commitment were needed to defeat the Axis.

Of all the critics, none was more influential than British Air Vice Marshal Sir
Arthur Coningham, who replaced Kuter as commander of the centralized Allied Air
Support Command during the Kasserine operation. While Eisenhower was opposed
to the British "committee system"* of command, he also advocated a commander
having the flexibility to organize forces to suit national proclivities, and he gave
Coningham the freedom to operate by his own style. Coningham now helped
convince Eisenhower and other high-level Allied leaders that close air support
forces must be organized on a basis of scarcity and that, in particular, ground
commanders could not expect as much close air support as they heretofore thought
necessary. In the context of military reversals, such as Kasserine, the senior
leaders of the Tunisian campaign found the economy-of-force principle more
acceptable.

Coningham ultimately discontinued several other Tunisian cooperative
practices, some first seen when he took over the Western Desert Air Force. He
criticized the defensive air cover flying mode, then used by the XII Air Support
Command and No. 242 Group. With the scarcity concept accepted, he promoted
the centralization of all tactical air resources under his control as air specialist
on the staff of the highest field commander. Division and corps commanders would
have to request close air support through the highest army commander. Although
they were primarily associated with their national force, the XII Air Support
Command and No. 242 Group would be commanded by Coningham rather than by
the II Corps or British First Army commanders. Coningham condemned the former
employment practice of having fighters on call and assigning them piecemeal to a
variety of targets that were not critical to the battle. He proclaimed that,
henceforth, air support missions would be offensive, with fighters seeking out the
enemy's air force at or near Axis bases. For ground attack missions, enemy

*The British met in committee and argued collectively for consensus on a decision,
whereas the American military system placed decision-making authority in the
hands of a single commander.

concentrations and soft-skinned vehicles, rather than tanks, would be appropriate
targets. Centralized control was a fundamental premise of Coningham's air
support concept. In view of limited air resources, all aircraft units should be used
in the highest priority missions. None could be held in reserve for the future use
of a currently inactive ground unit. Coningham, or another air commander fully
conversant with air capabilities, would determine allocation and employment upon
the ground commander's determination of objectives.

Coningham's opinions were important because the Combined Chiefs of Staff
saw him as a natural to command all tactical air resources in the new
Mediterranean Theater organization arranged at Casablanca in January 1943. He
was the primary choice for tactical command because of his success in combat
operations. Coningham saw a need to reform and remodel Allied forces in Tunisia,
like the successful Western Desert Army and Western Desert Air Force
combination that was, just then, destroying Rommel's forces in Libya, Allied
leaders in Casablanca endorsed his plan of operations when they gave him control
over American and British air support forces in the Mediterranean, forces which
were renamed as "tactical" air forces at that time.

The Casablanca reorganization resulted partially from a need to unify or
centralize command of all forces converging around Tunisia, to prepare for the
next strategic offensive, and to answer some of the weaknesses apparent in the
Tunisian command organization. Instead of separate commands in the western and
eastern sides of North Africa, forces were centralized under Eisenhower's
command. Instead of close air support commanded directly by an army, corps, or
task force commander, a tactical headquarters filtered requests and requirements.
Centralization of air resources, including the centralized tactical forces under
Coningham, followed substantially the British model of organizing equality
between air and ground commanders in field operations, with the exception of a
single commander at the theater level. The Combined Chiefs of Staff appointed
Eisenhower commander-in-chief of all Mediterranean forces and gave him three
British deputy commanders, one each for air, ground, and sea. They appointed
General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander as the overall ground force commander with
the title of chief of the 18th Army Group. The British First and Eighth Armies
were the two principal ground force subordinates of this new group. The U.S. II
Corps, commanded by Fredendall, Patton, and then Maj. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, in

succession, represented the smaller American contingent reporting to the 18th
Army Group. Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder became the chief of all air
units, excepting naval aviation, in the Mediterranean Air Command, with its three
regional air forces: Northwest African Air Forces, Malta Air Command, and
Middle East Command (Chart 2 ).

The Northwest African Air Forces (NAAF), commanded by Spaatz, was the
largest and most important air organization in the Tunisian campaign. Although
Allied leaders divided NAAF into functional units— strategic, tactical, and coastal
air forces; service and training commands; and a photographic reconnaissance
wing— the primary purpose of NAAF was almost exclusively tactically oriented.
The mission was to cooperate with the land force. Either directly or indirectly, the
forces were dedicated to furthering the advance of the land campaign. Along with
the indirect interdiction missions, the tactical forces had a specific charge to
provide close air support. Under Coningham, the No. 242 Group worked with the
British First Army; the Western Desert Air Force worked with Montgomery and the
Eighth Army; and the XII Air Support Command worked with the U.S. II Corps.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff gave Coningham the title of commander of
Northwest African Tactical Air Force (NATAF), the new organization providing air
support to the forces in Africa. NATAF "coincided" with the Army group level
controlling all air support units dedicated to the ground forces. Programmed to be
implemented at the end of February, when Montgomery's forces were scheduled to
enter southern Tunisia, Allied leaders precipitated an early reorganization because
of the German Kasserine offensive. The mixture of American and British officers
on theater and field staffs served to give the more experienced British greater
influence. Certainly, in the case of air support doctrine, Coningham's
methodology, learned in the Western Desert, was pressed on American air support
units. Many of Coningham's ideas were not unique to British air support. For
example, Eisenhower had already centralized army command under Anderson and
had directed Spaatz to coordinate air support through the Allied Air Support
Command formed in January. 3*

Coningham had the reputation to sway the debate on some of the fine points
separating ground and air force versions of ground support doctrine. On the
concept of central control, airmen were pleased. Many ground commanders in

Chart 2 — Allied Command Relationships in North Africa and the Mediterranean, March 1943

Northwest African
Strategic Air Force

Maj Gen J. H. Doolittle

Mediterranean
Air Command

Air Chief Marshal
Sir Arthur Tedder

Lt Gen Carl W. Spaatz, USAAF

Northwest African
Air Service Command

Brig Gen D. H. Dunton

Northwest African
Tactical Air Force

Northwest African
Air Forces

Malta Air Command

RAF

Middle East Command

Air Vice Marshal
Sir Keith Park

Air Chief Marshal
Sir W. Sholto Douglas

Northwest African
Training Command

Brig Gen J. K. Cannon

Northwest African
Coastal Air Force

RAF Mideast

Northwest African
Photographic
Reconnaissance Wing

Allied Force
Headquarters

Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower

1 8 Army Group

Commander-in-Chief
Mediterranean

Gen Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander

Br First Army

Lt Gen Kenneth Anderson

Br 5 Corps

XIX Fr Corps

Adm Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham, RN

Br Eighth
Army

Commander-in-Chief
Levant, RN

Commander Eighth Fleet

US Fifth
Army

Fr 1 Div ■

Gen Sir Bernard Montgomery Admiral Sir Henry Harwood

Gen Edgar
de Larminat

US II Corps Br (Prov)

Vice Admiral
H. K. Hewitt

NZ Corps

Br 10 Corps

Lt Gen Mark Wayne Clark

US I Corps

Br 30 Corps

Lt Gen C. W. Allfrey

Ninth Air Force

ISI

Br 1 Div

Maj Gen W. E.
Clutterbuck

Air Marshal
Sir Arthur Coningham

Air Vice Marshal
Hugh P. Lloyd

Lt Col Elliott Roosevelt

Maj Gen L. H. Brereton

Armor unit
nit

Br 6 Div

Maj Gen C. Keightley

Br 46 Div

Gen L. Koeltz

Fr Div

Gen Maurice Mathenel

Br 78 Div

Lt Gen G. S. Patton, Jr.

Lt Gen Sir B. C. Freyberg

Sir Brian G. Horrocks

Lt Gen Sir Oliver Leese

US 9 Div

Maj Gen M. S. Eddy

Fr Div

US 1 Div

Maj Gen O. Ward

US 34 Div

NZ 2 Div

(Freyberg)

US 1 Div

US 8 Bde

Fr Bde

4 Ind Div

Br 1 Div

Maj Gen R, Briggs

Maj Gen
Geoffrey Keyes

ISI

Br 51 Div

Maj Gen D. N. Wimberley

Br 50 Div

US V!
Corps

Maj Gen
E. J. Dawley

US 2 Div

Maj Gen E. N. Harmon

Br 7 Div

US 3 Div

Maj Gen H, A. Freeman-Attwood Maj Gen V. Evelegh

Gen E. Welvert

Maj Gen C. W. Ryder

Maj Gen Terry Allen

Gen Jacques LeClerc

Maj Gen F. I. S. Tuker

Maj Gen J. S. Nichols

Maj Gen G. Erskine

Maj Gen L. K. Truscott, Jr.

Source: Adapted by author from Howe, Northwest Africa, (facing) p. 486.

infantry u
Coordination

Tunisia, including the two major British and American army field generals,
Anderson and Fredendall, sought to use close air support aircraft to protect the
ground troops from enemy air attacks through constant air cover; to attack targets
immediately in front of the ground forces (like flying artillery); and, as observation
platforms, to watch close-in and more distant troop movements. Anderson had not
yet absorbed the doctrine of the Western Desert force; Fredendall had not agreed
with some of the points regarding organization, selective mission assignment, and
centralized command of air support, as expressed in contemporary War Department
publications or in Eisenhower's directive published before the TORCH landings.

Air leaders in Tunisia had been generally disappointed with Fredendall's
practices, especially when combat had shown that air cover and constant alerts
could not be carried out without an extraordinarily large air support force. Indeed,
Allied leaders recognized that more aircraft were needed in North Africa. Before
Kasserine and before Coningham's arrival in the Tunisian sector, the argument
between Spaatz and Kuter on one side and Frendendall and Anderson on the other
was more of a political tussle, with compromises that pleased no one. Ideas were
bent, but the distinctive air and ground perspectives remained philosophically
intact.

Coningham instituted subtle but important changes that challenged the
previous way of doing business and gave air leaders greater control and influence in
wartime air tactics. The air marshal divided tactical units into fighter and fighter-

bomber organizations— the latter for close air support. He removed the light
bombers from the air support units and put them under a tactical bomber
organization that was centralized at a higher level, under Coningham at NATAF.
Planning for air operations would be "determined by the air commander within the
framework of the Army-Air plan approved by the Army commander." The air plan
was as important as the ground plan: "The conception of making an army plan and
then asking what air assistance can be provided for it will result in air power being
overlooked during the important preliminary phases. . . ." 35

Coningham boldly promoted the idea of independent air support with an
endorsement from the successful Eighth Army commander, Montgomery. The
British commander wanted other ground commanders to appreciate some basic
aspects of air warfare. Coningham distributed to all air and ground commanders a

Montgomery-inspired pamphlet that was aimed directly at the subject of control of

close air support by ground generals. The pamphlet, illustrating many aspects of a

complex air warfare, proclaimed successful British principles:

Any officer who aspires to hold high command in war must understand
clearly certain basic principles regarding the use of air power.

The greatest asset of air power is its flexibility . . . the
flexibility inherent in Air Forces permits them ... to be switched
quickly from one objective to another in the theatre of operations. So
long as this is realized, then the whole weight of the available air power
can be used in selected areas in turn. This concentrated use of the air
striking force is a battle-winning factor of the first importance.

It follows that control of the available air power must be
centralized and command must be exercised through Air Force
channels. Nothing could be more fatal to successful results than to
dissipate the air resources into small packets placed under command of
army formation commanders, with each packet working on its own plan.
The soldier must not expect or wish, to exercise direct command over
air striking forces.

Two adjacent HQs will provide the associated military and air
commanders with the best opportunity of working together successfully.
Physical proximity by itself will not produce the answer, unless it
carries with it close individual contacts, a constant exchange of
information and a frank interchange of views. 36

On 16 February, in a presentation to Eisenhower and other Allied senior
officers, Coningham briefed the leaders on the major ideas of duality in modern
combat concepts, where air and ground leaders must recognize the difference, the
coequality, and the need to cooperate as one united entity, as was evident in the
Montgomery-Coningham team:

The Soldier commands the land forces, the Airman commands the
air forces; both commanders work together and operate their respective
forces in accordance with a combined Army-Air plan, the whole
operations being directed by the Army Commander.

The Army fights on a front that may be divided into sectors, such
as a Brigade, Division, Corps or an Army front. The Air front is
indivisible.

The Army has one battle to fight, the land battle. The Air has
two. It has first of all to beat the enemy air, so that it may go into the
land battle against the enemy land forces with the maximum possible
hitting power.

The fighter governs the front, and this fact forces the
centralization of air control into the hands of one air commander
operating on that front.

You will notice that the Army Commander does not use the word
"co-operation." I submit that we in Eighth Army are beyond the co-
operation stage, and that work is so close that we are, in effect, one
unit. 37

While most Allied airmen found Coningham's program acceptable, Coningham
knew he had a difficult task to convince Allied field generals, especially if they
would see fewer friendly aircraft over the battlefield. Coningham sent propaganda
material to all leaders in the theater. The success of Montgomery and failure of
Allied forces in western Tunisia helped sell the point. When Eisenhower and
Alexander gave their approval, the implementation followed regardless of opinions
of the field commanders. Some ground commanders disagreed and continued the

Coningham tried to serve the needs of the ground forces. During the Allied
counteroffensive against German forces in Kasserine, Coningham issued a directive
to all airmen in NATAF: Maximum effort would be provided to support land
operations; achieving and maintaining a high degree of air superiority would
achieve that aim; and, with ground forces unhindered by enemy air attack, the air
forces could give greater assistance to objectives in the rear battlefield area. 39

As commander of NAAF and as Coningham's superior, Spaatz quietly
supported the new changes for tactical aviation. He reported that ground troops
were encouraged to support themselves, using antiaircraft guns against dive
bomber attacks. If fighters developed an offensive against enemy air, then:
"Fighter forces can be used with economy not only to protect our ground forces
against dive bombing attacks ... but also effectively to engage the enemy in the
struggle for air superiority." But Spaatz was also sensitive to the occasional cross-
directions of air and ground leaders. He was very busy in the next few months
keeping peace between irritated air and ground leaders. He ordered that greater
effort be given to develop many close air support functions, including tactical
reconnaissaince and fighter-bomber and level-bombing attack techniques. He saw
the great need for training and perceived the importance of personality in "the
proper coordination of air effort with ground ef fort."'*

Back in the United States, Arnold's staff closely watched Coningham's
activities and examined his doctrinal statements. Many air and ground staff
officers had studied reports about close air support in the Western Desert. Some

argued against the Casablanca decision to divide forces into strategic and tactical
forces because it implied the very thing they were trying to avoid, namely, division
of forces into separate inflexible entities. Arnold continued to advocate
continuance of the radical strategic mission, dividing the air forces into tactical
and strategic combat roles to ensure that division. Kuter, fresh from the front,
became the chief spokesman for the new air support concept. In mid-May, Arnold
called Kuter from his assignment as deputy commander of NATAF and made him
assistant air chief of staff for plans.* 1

Marshall and the War Department agreed that the North Africa campaign
pointed to a revision of doctrine. Eisenhower authorized formation of a committee
of air and ground officers to work with the General Staff, G-3 Division, and in
short order the committee produced a newly formulated FM 100-20, Command and
Employment of Air Power. Approved by Marshall and the War Department, the
manual was published on 21 July 1943. The new doctrine acknowledged
Coningham's emphasis on the flexibility of air power and need for centralized
control under a knowledgeable air force commander, and that the theater
commander would exercise command of air forces through the air force
commander.

In some ways FM 100-20 was not especially innovative compared to prewar
doctrinal statements in field manuals and directives, especailly the 1942 FM 31-35,
Aviation in Support of Ground Forces. The contents suggested that the aviators'
expertise should carry weight in employment of air resources; that the theater
commander still made the final decisions on the disposition of ground and air
resources, as in FM 31-35; and, paralleling Eisenhower's pre-TORCH directive, that
"aviation units must not be parceled out as the advantage of massed air action and
flexibility will be lost." Finally, FM 100-20 argued that close air support must be
used prudently because "in the zone of contact, missions against hostile units are
most difficult to control, are most expensive, and are, in general, least effective.
Targets are small, well-dispersed, and difficult to locate. In addition, there is
always a considerable chance of striking friendly forces. . . ," i * 2

What was new about FM 100-20 was its frank proclamation of air power
equality in joint warfare: "THE AIR STRIKING FORCE IS A BATTLE WINNING
FACTOR OF THE FIRST IMPORTANCE." It stated explicitly that "LAND POWER

AND AIR POWER ARE CO-EQUAL AND INTERDEPENDENT FORCES; NEITHER
IS AN AUXILIARY OF THE OTHER." The manual asserted that a theater
commander would exercise command of ground forces through an air force
commander and command of ground forces through a ground force commander.
Since the greatest asset of air power was its flexibility, "CONTROL OF
AVAILABLE AIR POWER MUST BE EXERCISED THROUGH THE AIR FORCE
COMMANDER (caps in original) »«

It continued to argue, in bold type, that the first priority of tactical aviation
was gaining air superiority. TORCH planners had recognized the importance of air
superiority, but the new manual suggested that without it victory was unlikely:
"LAND FORCES OPERATING WITHOUT AIR SUPERIORITY MUST TAKE SUCH
EXTENSIVE SECURITY MEASURES AGAINST HOSTILE AIR ATTACK THAT
THEIR MOBILITY AND ABILITY TO DEFEAT THE ENEMY LAND FORCES ARE
GREATLY REDUCED (caps in original)." The manual implied that air components
must have overwhleming strength relative to opposing enemy air capabilities.

More problematic to the establishment of good joint relationships and
cooperative feelings, the manual established air interdiction and close air support
as second and third priorities, respectively. The manual clearly implied that close
air support had been subordinated, even though it emphasized positive goals of
closely coordinating the air and land elements: "The destruction of selected
objectives in the battle area in furtherance of the combined air-ground effort,
teamwork, mutual understanding, and cooperation are essential for the success of
the combined effort in the battle area." The document directed that cooperation
would be carried out by "timely planning conferences of pertinent commanders and
staffs, and through the exchange of liaison officers," and that air and ground liaison
officers would be "well versed in air and ground tactics."^

Some ground force proponents in Washington and field commanders in North
Africa were astounded. FM 100-20 had been approved without consulting McNair
and the Army Ground Forces planners. However, the new doctrine was instituted
immediately in Army ground school teachings. For example, in June 19^3, a month
before 100-20 was published, the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, ran a
lead article on the new air-ground doctrine in its monthly journal, The Mailing List .
(See illustrations from the journal on following pages).

The primary aim of the tactical air force is to establish and maintain air
superiority. Once air superiority has been obtained, air and ground forces can
carry on the battle with little interference by enemy planes. Air superiority is
obtained by attacking enemy airdromes and by destroying enemy planes on
the ground and in the air. The battle for the capture of German forces in
Tunisia began, according to General Kuter, with the attack of German
airdromes by 90 night bombers. B-26's and A-20's took up the daytime attack.
By the time the ground forces pushed off three days later, 1 1 2 German planes
had been destroyed.

Isolation of the battlefield is the second priority task of the tactical air force.
This includes the disruption of enemy lines of communication, the destruction
of supply dumps, installations and enemy troop concentrations in rear areas.
If the enemy is denied food, ammunition, and reinforcements, swift, aggressive
action by the ground forces will put him to rout. B-26's, shown above blasting
enemy railroad lines, were used effectively for this purpose in the North African
campaign.

Air missions against hostile ground units in the field of battle are the most
difficult to control, the most expensive, and the least effective. For these
reasons, these missions are lowest on the order of priority for missions of the
tactical air force. However, their successful execution is essential to the
combined air-ground effort. The P-51 shown above is strafing an enemy artillery
position, in the Sicilian campaign, the A-36 fighter-bomber (the P-51 equipped
with dive brakes and wing bomb racks) specialized in attacking such small but
worthwhile targets as truck convoys, trains, tanks, and artillery.

In Africa Eisenhower's headquarters accepted and promoted the new air-
ground relationship. In a sense, field commanders felt that they were forced to
cooperate, in contradiction to Coningham's theme of a team spirit between ground
and air forces. Eisenhower told Arnold that he agreed with the changes made with
the air forces and that he had great faith in his chief air adviser, Spaatz, although
the British charge that the "Air Force is subordinate to the Ground Forces"
alarmed him. He implied that the battlefield in North Africa was bigger than
doctrinal statements when he suggested that in a theater "where the character of
the problem makes it predominantly air, we try to put an airman in charge; where
the immediate problem is operations of Ground Forces, we make the top boss the
Ground." After Kasserine, air and ground commanders, taking the new doctrinal
statement with a grain of salt, immediately began to work out more practical,
real-world solutions for close air support in joint operations.* 6

Close Air Support After Kasserine

As the weather improved in March 19*3, air commanders expanded their
activities. Additional support aircraft, airfields, and supplies diluted some
complaints from the ground forces. Air planning became more an integral part of
the theater campaign planning. The airmen moved in as an integral part of
Alexander's 18th Army Group.* 7 As Kuter described the scene: "Alexander
controlled the land forces in the battle area. Coningham controlled the air forces
in the battle area." The two commanders held daily consultations, making "their
plans together, each stating what his force could contribute toward the general
victory. They worked in complete harmony." In some cases, factors important to
the air forces, such as need for close-in airfields and radar sites, were given
attention.**

As Montgomery's forces joined the western Tunisian force, combined efforts
between air and ground demonstrated aviation's flexibility. For example, when
Montgomery was ready to break through the Mareth Defensive Line, all three air
support forces concentrated for the task. The No. 242 Group left the British First
Army, joining up with the XII Air Support Command of the II Corps to conduct a
campaign against the German aircraft and airfields that might challenge the

British ground advance. The two forces kept enemy air occupied so that the
Western Desert Air Force could concentrate all its resources on assisting the
advancing army. Fighter-bombers even carried out the commonly eschewed low-
level attack operations on German ground troops. Shortly afterwards, the Desert
Air Force was reassigned from Montgomery's forces to help the American and
British forces in northen Tunisia. Writing to the tactical air forces, Alexander said
that "without your support this drive would just not have been possible."^ 9

Following the principles of flexibility, concentration, and primacy of theater
interests, at times the close air support resources were transferred to coastal
patrol missions. The Allies fully expected that they would shortly push the Axis
out of Africa. Partly, this was predicated on an expectation of stopping the
German resupply from Sicily, Sardinia, and Italy. Using radar and communications
intercepts, the air forces tried to choke off support to surviving German forces in
North Africa, which maintained a tenacious defense to the end. Airmen hoped that
the interdiction might force a surrender. In fact, Germany lost hundreds of
aircraft and tons of shipping in three months of heavy action, but supply did not
cease entirely. Interdiction was obviously less than completely successful when the
Axis chose to put an almost endless effort into a final defensive stance, but
interdiction greatly weakened the Axis and forced their early surrender. 50

Eisenhower remarked that the new Mediterranean tactical organization
"solved one of the most basic problems of modern warfare—how to apply air power
most effectively to the support of land operations." He also saw that the corps and
division commanders in combat would not be as pleased with the new order:
"Direct support of ground troops is naturally the method preferred by the
immediate military commander concerned," but his vision did not extend beyond
the local battle. It did not consider "the competing demands of individual
commanders on a far-flung battlefront, each of whom would naturally like to have
at his disposal some segment of the Air Force for his own exclusive use." 51

Concerns continued, personality and misunderstanding very much in tow.
Stukas continually attacked Allied ground forces, although by April Axis aircraft
were either destroyed or pulled out of the Tunisian campaign. The most celebrated
case involved Patton and Coningham. On 1 April, while Patton was serving as
commander of II Corps, his troops were bombed by enemy aircraft in a morning-

long attack. He complained that the lack of air cover allowed the Germans to
bomb all his division command posts and many supporting units. 52

Coningham, angered by the tone of Patton's report, replied with his own
report criticizing the bravery of the II Corps when the enemy attack resulted in
only six American casualties. He suggested that the II Corps might not be battle
worthy. The sharp personal exchange captured the attention of their senior
commanders, including Eisenhower and his chief air deputy, Tedder. Eventually
both Coningham and Patton were reprimanded for their bad manners and ordered to
meet face to face. The high-level air-ground team remained tense for a time.

Investigation of the incident illustrated the parochial interests in battle.
Patton criticized the air support commanders for lack of fighter cover and
particularly for their failure to stop an enemy tank advance. Williams, commander
of the XII Air Support Command, claimed bad weather prevented the takeoff of
aircraft designated for the job. He had even called the Western Desert Air Force
for help, but he had cancelled the proposed mission when he heard that Patton's
artillery had the tanks under control. Later in the Tunisian campaign, Patton
admitted that he was generally getting good close air support. Spaatz reported
that the lack of radar coverage and the separation of Patton's headquarters from
Williams' contributed to the problem. He took Williams and Patton's chief of staff
out to the Eighth Army and Western Desert Air Force to show them how a
successful joint operation worked. 53

Poor communications continued to be a serious factor throughout the
Tunisian campaign. Spaatz urged increased employment of air support parties,
assigned to ground forces, to call in requests and guide the ground commanders in
air support methods. He hoped that some help could be derived from the light
bombers that carried radios. Perhaps they could make air-ground contact and hit
targets identified by the air support parties. Unfortunately, the more effective
close air support fighter-bombers could not carry the heavy radios necessary for
good air-ground communications. The latter still consisted primarily of ground
smoke or colored panels if definite landmarks were not available. 5 **

Spaatz and Coningham gave individual attention to the sensitive air support
situation. They tried to instill a practice consistent with concepts evoked at higher
levels. Spaatz explained, in a letter to Arnold, how much personal effort by the air

commanders was required to keep the peace between the strong-willed air and
ground commanders. On one occasion Spaatz noticed that the centralized
communications system operated from Alexander's 18th Army Group headquarters
did not work adequately. Coordination was required both ways, up the command as
well as down. Ground and air commanders needed to actively share problems and
activities. In mid-April, after replacing Patton as commander of II Corps, Bradley
expressed concern about the lack of aerial photographs and reconnaissance. Spaatz
agreed that ground forces had not been given much observation support; most
reconnaissance missions had sought intelligence for air force needs. Spaatz
thought that he had found the problem in an ineffective air liaison officer assigned
to II Corps. He asked Kuter to assign a more senior officer for the rest of the
Tunisian campaign. 55

By May Allied air forces, including the determined close air support units,
helped the Allied ground forces corner 270,000 Axis troops in northeast Tunisia.
Allied air finally dominated the Axis air forces, compelling all but a few scattered
fighter units to operate from Sicily and Italy. In some ways the Allied offensive,
including the air-ground cooperation, was remarkable, especially given one of the

for major operations. Estimates of required air support in October 1942 had
depressed everyone in the Washington and London planning circuits. The War
Department had half expected North Africa to be a relatively safe place for
advanced training, but the maneuvering of a combined Allied force proved to be
difficult for inexperienced ground and air personnel.

Some field generals were dubious about the adequacy of their air support.
Neither the XII Air Support Command nor the combined Allied air forces could
guarantee them protection from disruptive enemy air attack. Enemy aircraft over
the battlefield diminished in number but continued their attacks, nonetheless, until
the end of operations in May 1943. Division commanders often would get air
support under the centralized command arrangement. Corps and army commanders
could not depend on timeliness of requested air support. Friendly air support often
proved ineffective in dislodging the defense-minded Axis ground forces, and air
observation of enemy movements was not effective until the air forces could
allocate enough escort fighters for the reconnaissance flights.

TORCH— that American troops were not ready

Air leaders were pleased with changes in air support organization and
operational tactics. Greater understanding of aircraft limitations and capabilities
by ground leaders, centralization of air support resources, and prioritization of
missions allowed the air commander to exercise the accepted principles of air
warfare better. The XII Air Support Command commander, Williams, reported that
his forces were integrated into the larger theater air concerns, as well as those of
the ground commanders he served. In his report on operations Williams noted that
he and his principal staff officers "lived and operated with the Corps Commanders
during most of the period." While a strong consensus pervaded the joint command
posts, sometimes staff officers had to argue out issues. Williams stated that his air
staff gave consideration to ground commanders who had urgent requests for close
air support. The air support parties provided the communications system and had
the experts to give ground commanders advice on the spot. Basically the airmen
ran the air support operation, 80 percent of the support missions originating from
their operations center. Both Fredendall and Patton had advised Williams not to
wait for close air support requests: "You know what the situation is, just keep
pounding them." 56

Introduction of the fighter-bomber, fighters with bomb racks and extra
armor, promised more effective attacks on the small well-protected targets
favored by the ground forces. The new aircraft type, developed from combat
experience, was also important as a symbol for the joint air-ground operations
team. The close air support portion of the theater tactical air forces now had an
aircraft specifically identified for ground attack. The air support command no
longer relied only on fighter and light and medium bomber units that were also
responsible for other Army Air Forces missions. Furthermore, now close air
support was a more clearly defined mission of the theater tactical air forces, even
if it held a lower priority than air superiority and battlefield isolation missions.

The military and civilian leaders in Washington and London and the
commanders in the Mediterranean Theater were generally pleased with close air
support doctrine and practice, even though the debate over allocation of resources
and precise points of force control continued among staff officers. Eisenhower
appreciated the new centralized, more personal style of air support, although he
worried that he was not effectively transmitting his thinking to the field

commanders. New doctrinal points did not flow systematically through successive
commanders. American inexperience, individualized field generalship, differing
opinions about command, and enduring prejudices prevented a smooth transfer of
close air support lessons. Much might be blamed on poor coordination of doctrine
between theater and field staffs. The different viewpoints of theater and field and
those of brigade, division, and corps levels were not bridged successfully.
Inadequate command and control systems caused problems. The newly declared
independence of the air forces, at a time when tactics and organization for air
warfare were changing rapidly, put additional strain on the air-ground relationship.
Air and ground leaders had to continue the struggle of forming a cooperative
combat team. 57

Endnotes— Chapter II

1. John Terraine, A Time For Courage; The Royal Air Force in the European
War, 1939-1945 (New York; Macmillan, 1985), pp. 337-51; Wesley Frank
Craven and dames Lea Gates, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II , 7
vols. (Chicago: University Press, 1948-58), vol. 2, Europe: TORCH to
POINTBLANK. August 1942 to December 1943 (1949), pp. 9-40; Craven and
Cate, Plans and Early Operations , 1:339-41; Rpt, Maj Gen Lewis H. Brereton,
3 Nov 42, sub: Direct Air Support in the Libyan Desert, USAFHRC Microfilm
Collection, 145.96-64, MAFB.

2. Craven and Cate, Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK , 2:22-27.

3. Operation Memo no. 17, 13 Oct 42, sub: Combat Aviation in Direct Support of
Ground Units, Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ), USAFHRC Microfilm
Collection, 103.2808, MAFB.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Dwight David Eisenhower, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower , ed.
Alfred D. Chandler, 3r., 5 vols. (Baltimore: 3ohn Hopkins Press, 1970), 2:874;
George F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West ,
United States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of
Military History, Department of the Army, 1957), pp. 32-88; Craven and
Cate, Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK , 2:41-66; I. S. O. Playfair et al. t The
Mediterranean and the Middle East , History of the Second World War: United
Kingdom Military Series, 6 vols. (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office,
1954-73), vol. 4, The Destruction of the Axis Forces in Africa (1966), pp.
110-28.

8. Craven and Cate, Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK , 2:50-66.

9. Eisenhower, Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower , 1:445 and 474 and 2:837;
Msg, Adjutant General, WD, to CGs, 1 Oct 42, sub: Reassignment of Army
Air Force Units, USAFHRC Microfilm Collection, 651.271, MAFB; Ltr, Maj
Gen George S. Patton, 3r., to Brig Gen 3. K. Cannon, 10 Oct 42, sub: Letter
of Instructions, USAFHRC Microfilm Collection, 650.01-2, MAFB; Craven
and Cate, Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK, 2:50-66.

10. Memo, Arnold to Asst CofS, OPD, WD, 16 3ul 42, sub: Tactical Command of
Army Air Units, H. H. Arnold Manuscript Collection, box 114, LOC.

11. Eisenhower, Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, 1:445 and 474 and 2:837;
Msg, Adjutant General, WD, to CGs, 1 Oct 42, sub: Reassignment of Army
Air Force Units, USAFHRC Microfilm Collection, 651.271, MAFB; Ltr, Maj

Gen George S. Patton, Jr., to Brig Gen 3. K. Cannon, 10 Oct 42, sub: Letter
of Instructions, USAFHRC Microfilm Collection, 650.01-2, MAFB; Craven
and Cate, Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK . 2:50-66.

12. Ltr, Brig Gen Games H. Doolittle to Maj Gen George S. Patton, sub: Torch
Air Support, 13 Sep 42, USAFHRC Microfilm Collection, 650.430-1 MAFB.

13. HQ Center Task Force Plans, annex 5, "Paratroop Plan and Air Support Plan,"
4 Oct 42, USAFHRC Microfilm Collection, 650.03-2, MAFB.

14. Craven and Cate, Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK , 2:67-85; Howe,
Northwest Africa , pp. 97-253.

15. Ibid.; Commander-in-Chief's Dispatch, North African Campaign, 1942-1943,
AFHQ, USAFHRC Microfilm Collection, 621.101-4, MAFB.

16. Howe, Northwest Africa, pp. 277-346; Craven and Cate, Europe: TORCH to
POINTBLANK . 2:78-85.

17. Howe, Northwest Africa , pp. 277-98; Playfair, Destruction of the Axis
Forces, 4:165-91; F. H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War ,
2 vols. (London: Her Majesty's Sationery Office, 1984), 2:475-93; Craven and
Cate, Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK , 2:107-08.

18. Craven and Cate, Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK , 2:78-91; Greenfield,
Army Ground Forces and Air-Ground Battle Team , p. 19; Howe, Northwest
Africa , pp. 373-76; Rpt, Maj Gen Terry Allen, HQ, 1st Inf Div, 25 Dec 42,
sub: Lessons From Operation Torch, USAFHRC Microfilm Collection,
621.549-3, MAFB; Ltr, Brig Gen Paul M. Robinett to Marshall, North Africa,
8 Dec 42, H. H. Arnold Manscript Collection, box 42, LOC.

19. Howe, Northwest Africa , pp. 277-98; Playfair, Destruction of the Axis
Forces . 4:165-91; Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War ,
2:475-93; Craven and Cate, Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK , 2:107-08.

20. Craven and Cate, Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK . 2:78-91; Greenfield,
Army Ground Forces and Air-Ground Battle Team , p. 19; Howe, Northwest
Africa , pp. 373-76.

21. Howe, Northwest Africa , pp. 383-84; Craven and Cate, Europe: TORCH to
POINTBLANK , 2:106-12; Arthur William Tedder, With Prejudice: The War
Memoirs of Marshall of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1966), p. 370.

22. Howe, Northwest Africa, pp. 376-82; Craven and Cate, Europe: TORCH to
POINTBLANK , 2:108-12.

23. Rpt, HQ, Twelfth Air Force, Brig Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg, CofS, 6 3an 43,
sub: XII Air Support Command, USAFHRC Microfilm Collection, 168.7043-5,
MAFB.

24. Rpt, HQ, XII Air Support Command, Brig Gen H. A. Craig, Cdr, 6 Jan 43, sub:
General Plan of Air Support in Operation "SATIN," HQ XII Air Support
Command, USAFHRC Microfilm Collection 168.7043-5, MAFB.

25. Craven and Gate, Europe: TORCH to FQINTBLANK, 2:132-45; Howe,
Northwest Africa , pp. 374-87.

26. Interv, Intelligence Service, USAAF, with Maj Gen L. E. Oliver, 5 Feb 43,
USAFHRC Microfilm Collection 650.03.3, MAFB.

27. Craven and Cate, Europe: TORCH to FQINTBLANK , 2:132-45; Memo, Maj
Gen Carl Spaatz, 17 Jan 43, Carl Spaatz Manuscript Collection, box 10, LOC;
Martin Blumenson, Kasserine Pass (Boston: Jove, 1966), pp. 84-86.

28. Howe, Northwest Africa , pp. 383-84. Craven and Cate, Europe: TORCH to
POINTBLANK , 2:142-45.

29. Howe, Northwest Africa, pp. 386-400; Craven and Cate, Europe: TORCH to
POINTBLANK, 2:142-43; War Department Basic Field Manual 31-35, Aviation
in Support of Ground Forces, 9 Apr 42.

30. Quoted words from Eisenhower, Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower , 2:904-05
and 981-82. See also Howe, Northwest Africa , pp. 396-400.

31. Eisenhower, Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower , 2:904-05.

32. Craven and Cate, Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK , 2:142-45; Howe,
Northwest Africa , pp. 397-98; Report on Operations Conducted by XII Air
Support Command, USAAF, Tunisia, 13 Jan 43 to 9 Apr 1943, p. 22,
USAFHRC Microfilm Collection, 350.01-2, MAFB.

33. Unless otherwise noted, discussion of the Kasserine Pass operations is based
on Craven and Cate, Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK , 2:113-15, 153-66,
418; Howe, Northwest Africa , pp 401-59 and 492-95.

34. 18th Army Group Operation Instruction no. 3, 1 Mar 43, USAFHRC Microfilm
Collection, 612.4300, MAFB.

35. Directives, Northwest Africa Tactical Air Force, 2 Mar 43, subs: The
Employment of Air Forces in Support of Land Operations and Formation of
Tactical Bomber Forces, USAFHRC Microfilm Collection, 612.4501, MAFB;
Excerpts from HQ, MTAF, Report on Operations During the Campaign in
Tunisia, USAFHRC Microfilm Collection, 614.4300, MAFB.

36. Some Notes of the Use of Air Power in Support of Land Operations, Intro by
B. L. Montgomery, December 1944, USAFHRC Microfilm Collection,
168.6006-137, MAFB.

37. Report of Tunisian Operations, XII Air Support Command, 10 Apr to 13
May43, USAFHRC Microfilm Collection, 651.3069-1, MAFB.

38. Tedder, With Prejudice , pp. 397-401 .

39. Report of Tunisian Operations, XII Air Support Command, 10 Apr to 13 May
43, USAFHRC Microfilm Collection, 651.3069-1, MAFB.

40. Rpt, Spaatz, March 19*3, sub: Ground Air Support, USAFHRC Microfilm
Collection, 612.4501, MAFB.

Futrell, Ideas, p. 69;

42. War Department Field Manual 100-20, Command and Employment of Air
Power, 21 Jul 43.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Eisenhower, Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower , 2:1107 and 1196; Infantry
School "Air Ground Training," The Mailing List , duly 1943, pp. 1-38.

47. Craven and Cate, Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK , 2:170-71.

48. Press Conference, Brig Gen Laurence 5. Kuter, 22 May 43, USAFHRC
Microfilm Collection, 614.505, MAFB.

49. Ibid.

50. Craven and Cate, Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK . 2:145-53, 174-75, 182-

51. Dispatch, Commander-in-Chief's Dispatch, North African Campaign, 1942-
1943, AFHQ, USAFHRC Microfilm Collection, 621.101-4, MAFB; Albert F.
Simpson, "Tactical Air Doctrine: Tunisia and Korea," Air University
Quarterly Review 4 (Summer 1951): 7.

52. Tedder, With Prejudice , pp. 409-12; Craven and Cate, Europe: TORCH to
POINTBLANK , 2:176-77.

53. Craven and Cate, Europe; TORCH to POINTBLANK , 2:145-53, 174-75, 182-
96; George S. Patton, 3r., The Pattern Papers , ed. Martin Blurnenson, 2 vols.
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972-74), vol. 2, 1940-1945 (1974), pp. 203-08;
Maj Gen Carl Spaatz Diary, April 1943, Spaatz Manuscript Collection, box 11,

54. Report of Tunisian Operations, XII Air Support Command, 10 Apr to 13 May
43, USAFHRC Microfilm Collection, 350.01-2, MAFB.

55. Spaatz Diary, April 1943, Spaatz Manuscript Collection, box 11, LOC;
Greenfield, Army Ground Forces and Air-Ground Battle Team , pp. 45 and 51.

56. Report of Operations Conducted by XII Air Support Command, USAAF,
Tunisia, 13 Jan 43 to 9 Apr 43, USAFHRC Microfilm Collection, 350.01-2,

57. Martin Blumenson, Mark Clark (New York: Congdon <5c Weed, 1984), pp. 64-70
and 118; War Department Field Manual 100-20, Command and Employment of
Air Power, 21 Jul 43, p. 9.

EPILOGUE

Eventually, the campaign in North Africa would be viewed as a sideshow to
important campaigns that followed in Europe. For Americans, as well as the
British, it was a serious training ground, offering both practical experience and
valuable training in modern warfare. Even before the final Axis surrender in
Tunisia the air leaders, Tedder, Spaatz, and Coningham, were writing their views of
close air support for the Sicily campaign plans. Eisenhower and other Allied
leaders broadly supported the third-priority concept for close air support and the
need to gain air superiority before another invasion. Both before and during the
early stages of the ground campaigns in Sicily and Italy Coningham's tactical air
forces joined missions with Doolittle's strategic air forces to work on the first
priorities, gaining air superiority and hampering the Axis supply lines.

It remained to be seen how leaders viewed air support in this and other
campaigns, how theater commanders concurred or differed with the principles and
practices developed in North Africa, how the heightened interplay of air and
ground doctrine was sorted out. Would the strong expression of air force tactical
air principles survive? Would aircraft builders be able to answer the call for an
effective fighter-bomber or observation aircraft, or would the vicissitudes of
battle conditions change the requirements? Would communications technology
provide better air-ground and command systems? Would better joint training, as
promised by McNair and Arnold, help the relationship between air and ground
personnel? With all the promises of improvement, how would close air support
practices differ from those in North Africa?

*U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1987 - 191-127 : QL 3

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